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Abstract  
 
 Despite the meaningful impact that credit ratings have on sovereign countries 
and financial markets, research has not fully explored the determinants of these ratings 
in many emerging markets (EMs). The aim of this study was to identify and quantify the 
extent to which different macroeconomic factors impact sovereign ratings. Based on a 
review of the literature, an analysis of rating agencies' methodology papers, and 
economic intuition, it was hypothesised that measures of wealth, economic growth, 
monetary stability, fiscal trajectory, external accounts and governance would predict EM 
credit ratings. This hypothesis was largely supported by regression models that 
anticipated actual ratings with predictive power comparable to extant research, but 
across a much broader set of EM countries. By identifying the key drivers of these 
ratings, the current research suggests several areas that policymakers can address to 
improve their own sovereign ratings. 
 
 
Key terms: economics, macroeconomics, governance, monetary, fiscal, balance of 
payments, emerging markets, developed markets, frontier markets, credit ratings, 
sovereign ratings, rating agencies 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 “There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United 
States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by 
dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And 
believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who is more powerful” (Friedman 1996). 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long been a controversial group of 
businesses. In a near oligopoly, three agencies issue ratings on corporations, municipal 
governments, securitised instruments, and perhaps most visibly, sovereign nations. 
Changes in sovereign credit ratings often have enormous immediate market impact. 
When Moody’s downgraded Portugal in January 2012, the yield on its government 
bonds rose by 200 basis points. Across emerging markets (EMs), a downgrade is often 
associated with a statistically significant increase in bond yields as well as CDS spreads 
(Afonso, Furceri & Gomes 2012; Cantor & Packer 1996). Conversely, upgrades often 
result in immediately positive effects in local markets. When Colombia was upgraded to 
investment-grade in March 2011, the local stock market spiked 4.3% in a single day 
(Colombia gains investment-grade… 2011). 
 Agencies, and the ratings themselves, are critical in financial markets (Jaramillo 
& Tejada 2011). The sharp increase in bond yields associated with rating downgrades 
mechanically increases the cost of funding for countries that seek bond issuance in 
global markets. Moreover, countries that are downgraded can risk exclusion from critical 
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global bond indices. For example, in the case of Portugal's downgrade, its selloff was 
more acute because it was subsequently dropped from investment-grade bond indices. 
Overnight, Portugal became un-investable for many global investors. 
 Sovereign credit ratings not only raise funding costs for countries, but they also 
raise the cost of funding for quasi-sovereign and corporate entities in the country 
(Hornung et al. 2013). Indeed, more often than not, the sovereign rating represents a 
ceiling on the maximum rating that a company domiciled in the country can receive. 
Therefore, sovereign ratings often "trickle down" to banks, real estate companies, 
mining companies, utilities and every facet of a country's credit markets.  
 Although difficult to quantify, it is reasonable to assume that sovereign credit 
ratings also affect the global perception of countries. In some cases, such as Greece 
and Russia, downgrades have been caused in part by political or geopolitical strife. A 
downgrade may not only be a symptom of weakness in underlying economic and 
governance factors, but it can also cause incrementally more negative attention on a 
country.  
 Given the tremendous importance of sovereign ratings, they have been well 
studied by researchers in terms of at least two aspects. First, much research has been 
done on the impact that credit changes have on financial markets. Cantor and Packer 
(1996) found that changes in credit ratings had a significant impact on dollar bond 
spreads across 39 different historical rating events. Indeed, in more recent research, 
Afonso et al. (2012) found that government bond yield spreads changed significantly 
after changes in credit ratings. Moreover, they discovered a "persistence effect" in 
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which countries that had suffered a rating downgrade had higher bond spreads for at 
least six months after the downgrade.  
 Second, research has focused on the determinants of credit ratings in developed 
markets and, to a much lesser extent, large EMs. In their seminal research, Cantor and 
Packer (1996) identified eight critical variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth, IMF 
development index, inflation, fiscal balance, current account, external debt, and default 
history), which explained the level of sovereign credit ratings across almost 50 
countries. Unfortunately, within the dataset, only about half of the countries could be 
classified as an “emerging market” or EM economy. In subsequent research, Afonso 
(2003) was able to confirm five of the variables originally investigated by Cantor and 
Packer (1996), and found that GDP per capita, GDP growth, industrial indicator, 
external debt and a default history indicator were significant predictors of ratings. 
Despite the impressive analyses that were able to explain over 90% of the variability in 
credit ratings, Afonso (2003) chose to focus the analyses on developed markets, which 
comprised more than half of the dataset. Many authors after Afonso (2003) also chose 
to include both developed markets and EMs in the datasets (see figure 1.1 below).  
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Figure 1.1: Number of EM and developed market countries included in each paper's 
sample  
 
Previous research may have committed aggregation errors by including highly 
developed countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, with emerging countries such as 
Honduras and Ecuador. The current research minimises this risk by only focusing on 
EMs. The current study has a dataset with nearly twice the number of emerging markets 
as earlier research, as shown in figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of EM countries in each paper’s sample versus number of countries 
in current research  
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Of special consideration in the current research are “frontier markets”, which are 
loosely defined as having GDP per capita levels of less than USD 2000 per year. 
Hitherto, these countries have been largely ignored in empirical efforts as shown in 
figure 1.3 (Speidell & Krohne 2007).  
.
 
Figure 1.3: Number of frontier market countries in each paper’s sample versus number 
of countries in current research  
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Inflation rates in both Argentina and Venezuela are severely underestimated by official 
statistical agencies in each country (Bronstein 2015; By hook or crook 2015). 
 Second, many countries have started receiving fresh coverage by CRAs. 
Obviously it would have been impossible to include countries in the early analyses that 
were simply not rated. Remarkably, Moody's did not cover Nigeria (the largest economy 
in Africa), Kenya and Zambia until 2012 (Els 2012). Moody’s launched coverage of 
Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia in 2012, adding Serbia and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in 2013. Many of these countries have sufficient economic 
statistics that are published by the IMF which, in turn, permit analysis of the drivers of 
their ratings (IMF 2015). 
 Finally, researchers may have wanted to identify the determinants of ratings for 
countries with which they were familiar, rather than smaller and less well-developed 
countries. It is easier to gather data for Brazil and South Africa, which are covered by all 
three agencies than for Rwanda or Benin, which are only covered by S&P and Fitch. 
There is some parallel in both investor research with "home bias" (Coval & Moskowitz 
1999), and in behavioural psychology with the "familiarity effect" (Zajonc 1968). 
 Regardless of the historical reasons for omitting EMs, it now behoves 
researchers to identify the determinants of ratings in these markets. As of 2014, EMs 
represent nearly 51% of global GDP, versus only 31% in 1980 (IMF 2014). Historically, 
many global crises that damaged developed markets may have originated in EMs, for 
example, the Mexican currency crisis in 1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 
Russian debt crisis in 1998, to name a few. More recently, much attention has been 
given to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece (Barber 2009; Fidler 2015). EMs are 
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powerful enough in the global economy that it is no longer true that they are unilaterally 
influenced by developed markets only──rather they influence each other and larger 
economies as well. When emerging markets catch a cold, developed markets also get 
sick. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 Given the plethora of research on developed market credit ratings, and the 
notable lack of focus on EMs, the research objective of the current study was to 
establish the determinants of credit ratings in EMs. To achieve this objective, it was 
necessary to perform detailed reviews of the existing literature, analyse CRA 
methodology papers and propose determinants of credit quality with intuitive economic 
rationale. After potential determinants of credit ratings had been identified, empirical 
tests were performed to examine their efficacy in predicting ratings, as described in 
chapter 3. 
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1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 Based on a detailed review of the existing literature and sovereign rating 
methodology papers, the following primary hypotheses were formulated. These are 
described further in chapter 3:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Measures of wealth, economic growth, monetary stability, fiscal 
prudence, balance of payments vulnerability and governance predict both EM local and 
foreign-currency credit ratings.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Measures of policy strength, political stability and institutional frameworks 
predict both EM local and foreign-currency ratings. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The lower the development of a country is, the more important measures 
of governance become in predicting both EM local and foreign-currency ratings. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD OVERVIEW  
Given the primary research objective, as well as structure of the dataset, the 
above hypotheses were tested using regression analysis. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) was used. OLS has often been used to 
measure the predictive power of economic determinants of credit ratings (Cantor & 
Packer 1996; Eliasson 2002). To test hypothesis 3, an OLS model with interaction 
variables was used.  
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 Chapter 1 presented the background and problem statement, namely that there 
is a scarcity of research on the determinants of EM credit ratings, as well as the 
research objectives and hypotheses that follow from this gap in the literature. Chapter 2 
presents the theoretical background of the study with an extensive review of the 
frameworks the three major CRAs use to issue sovereign ratings. It continues with a 
review of the extant studies to identify potential variables that previous researchers 
have used to predict sovereign ratings, and then analyses the economic rationale for 
other proposed variables. Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology and 
hypotheses, and concomitant methods of investigating the hypotheses. Chapter 4 
describes the formal research findings and interpretations, and continues by contrasting 
these with previous research. Chapter 5 summarises the study and explores policy and 
research implications. 
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CHAPTER 2: CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter starts with an overview of CRAs and continues with an analysis of 
the philosophy and process that each of the three major agencies follows to determine 
creditworthiness. The chapter proceeds with an analysis of the literature and identifies 
the relative lack of empirical attention given to EMs, a problem which, in turn, is the 
impetus for the primary research objective discussed at the beginning of chapter 3. 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF RATING AGENCIES 
 Assigning a sovereign credit rating is inherently subjective. Each of the major 
agencies concedes that it is challenging to assess qualitative factors such as 
“willingness to pay” and “political volatility”, as well as “institutional strength” of fiscal and 
monetary institutions. (Fitch research…2013; Hornung et al. 2013; S&P: Sovereign 
government… 2011). However, before examining the historical literature that details the 
empirical determinants of sovereign ratings, it is clearly informative to go to the sources 
of these ratings, namely the CRAs themselves, to understand how ratings are assigned. 
Each CRA periodically publishes working papers on its rating philosophy. Although the 
papers differ widely in their level of detail, they are useful in understanding some of the 
broad approaches that the agencies take to render ratings. As a starting point, the 
current study analysed the most recent commentaries on rating methodologies from 
each of the major agencies. 
Collectively, three CRAs, based in the USA, capture at least 90% of all global 
credit ratings that are issued. Hence Fitch, S&P and Moody’s are often called the so-
called “Big Three" (Alessi, Wolverson & Sergie 2013:2). Each of the agencies is 
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considered a Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation (NRSRO) by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although each agency issues thousands 
of ratings across companies, municipalities, asset-backed obligations and state-
dependent companies, the focus for the current research was on long-term sovereign 
ratings for both foreign and local-currency bonds. 
 
2.2 FITCH: PHILOSOPHY AND PROCESS  
Fitch ratings was founded in 1913 by John Knowles Fitch and is currently 
headquartered in New York and London. It issues ratings across various sectors, 
issuers and securities in over 100 countries (Fitch research… 2013). Fitch’s sovereign 
ratings are used “by over 90% of the world’s largest investors” (Fitch research… 
2013:para. 1). Fitch maintains a disciplined and quantitative approach to issuing 
sovereign ratings. The motivation for its sovereign rating framework is to “capture the 
willingness as well as the capacity of the sovereign to meet its debt obligations” (Riley, 
Stringer, Fox & Colquhoun 2012:1). Fitch attempts to issue ratings that are consistent 
across time and countries. To issue ratings through the full economic cycle, the agency 
accounts for both cyclical and structural trends. 
Similar to other agencies, Fitch issues both short and long-term foreign-currency 
debt ratings (to reflect the credit quality of bonds not issued in local currency), as well as 
local-currency debt ratings (Riley et al. 2012). Short-term ratings refer to debt with 
maturities of 13 months or fewer. The primary analytical difference between foreign and 
local-currency debt considerations is that of exchange rate risk. This refers to the fact 
that countries that issue foreign-currency bonds must often collect revenues in the local 
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currency. Therefore, large currency depreciations mechanically increase the foreign-
currency debt load. However, there are some exceptions. First, if a country is a large 
commodity exporter, much of its foreign-exchange needs can be satisfied through 
commodity exports. Second, many countries are partially dollarised (e.g. Panama, Peru 
and Bolivia), and generate revenues in dollars that can be used to support foreign-
currency debt. Third, some countries are part of currency unions (e.g. the EMU) and the 
foreign and local-currency ratings are thus identical. 
Nevertheless, most countries that issue bonds in a currency other than their own 
are subject to exchange rate risk and, as a result, Fitch usually issues a local-currency 
bond rating that is equal to or slightly better than the foreign-currency rating (Riley et al. 
2012). Local-currency ratings can be weaker than foreign-currency ratings because 
national governments can control some of the domestic money supply and in theory 
“monetise” their local-currency debts. For examples of the natural inflationary 
consequences of countries that chronically monetise local debts, one need only 
examine Argentina and Venezuela’s price dynamics. 
Does exchange rate risk present enough of a threat to foreign-currency ratings to 
change the rating framework that Fitch uses to issue ratings? As before, local-currency 
ratings are often the same or slightly better than foreign-currency ratings, but Fitch 
contends that “sovereign creditworthiness in terms of both foreign and local-currency 
debt is a function of all the various factors that influence the stand-alone credit quality of 
the government … the relationship between various factors that influence the intrinsic 
credit quality of the sovereign and the ability to access foreign-exchange are complex, 
change over time and cannot be clearly delineated” (Riley et al. 2012:4). Therefore, 
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even though the current study examined the determinants of both foreign and local-
currency debt ratings, no substantial differences were expected (or found) in the results. 
In terms of the actual mechanics of assigning a rating, Fitch analyses four broad 
economic and governance factors, in terms of current and forecasted performance. 
First, the agency examines the overall macroeconomic potential, as well as associated 
policies and their credibility. This factor accounts for 10.3% of the overall rating (Riley et 
al. 2012). Fitch’s second component comprises 47.4% of the overall rating and is 
composed of structural features of the economy, such as governance indicators, wealth, 
money supply and the number of years since the last default. Fitch’s third component 
accounts for 16.9% of the overall rating and captures external factors such as current 
account deficit, international reserve levels and commodity dependence. The final factor 
represents 25.4% of the rating and includes factors related to public finances such as 
debt levels, fiscal balance and interest burden. 
 
2.3 MOODY'S: PHILOSOPHY AND PROCESS  
The second of the Big Three, Moody’s Investors Service was founded in 1909 by 
John Moody and, like Fitch, is considered an NRSRO by the SEC. Similar to Fitch, 
Moody’s includes over 100 countries and rates them according to a quantitative and 
qualitative framework that captures the willingness and ability of a sovereign to pay its 
debts. However, Moody’s, unlike Fitch, seems relatively more focused on qualitative 
frameworks in issuing sovereign ratings. Its rating methodology concentrates on four 
factors with quantitative and discretionary components (Hornung, Byrne & Robinson 
2013).  
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As with Fitch, significant discretion is exercised when rendering ratings. The 
agency can take into account all four factors for the rating, but it is not necessarily 
bound to them. It uses “supplementary adjustment factors” to reflect nuances specific to 
individual countries (Hornung et al. 2013:para. 31). Moreover, ratings incorporate 
expectations around future economic and political developments and these are difficult 
to quantify, and it follows that the agency exercises significant discretion. Finally, in 
some cases, the agency receives confidential information that it cannot disclose, but 
can still use in its rating assessment. For these three reasons, there is no deterministic 
methodology that allows an exact rating to be assigned given quantifiable factors. 
Rather, there is always some subjective judgement involved. 
The first factor considered by Moody’s relates to “economic strength”, which 
measures the wealth, actual growth and potential growth, competitiveness and 
economic diversity of a country (Hornung et al. 2013). Similar to Fitch, Moody’s uses 
measures of both current economic strength, and forecasted economic strength. 
Because the ability of the sovereign to extinguish its debt obligations is predicated on its 
ability to grow and generate more revenues, this factor is critical. In fact, according to 
analyses conducted by the agency, at least 51% of sovereign defaults were related to 
underlying economic weakness and associated problems sustaining a high debt burden 
with low growth. Included in this factor of “economic strength” is an assessment of the 
vulnerability of a country to a terms of trade shock– for example, the recent collapse in 
oil prices has caused a major adjustment in terms of trade in Russia which, along with 
extreme political factors, catalysed the downgrade to non-investment grade by all three 
CRAs in 2014 and 2015. Within this factor, the agency analyses overall GDP growth, 
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competitiveness measures and GDP per capita. There is also a measure of discretion 
involved in examining credit growth in a country and the extent of diversification. 
Countries with economic growth not driven by credit growth alone, as well as countries 
with more economic diversity, are often subjectively assigned higher ratings within this 
first factor. 
 The second factor Moody’s considers is the overall institutional strength of the 
country. The agency tries to identify the extent to which fiscal and monetary policies 
promote economic development. Within this factor, there are sub-factors that measure 
government effectiveness, corruption and the rule of law. In their estimation, 30% of 
defaults have been directly related to institutional strength. For example, Mongolia 
missed debt payments and defaulted in 1997 largely because of poor budget 
management (Hornung et al. 2013). Paraguay defaulted in 2002 on domestically issued 
dollar bonds held by foreign banks and the sovereign required that the maturities be 
extended by three years (Hornung et al. 2013). The classic cautionary tale of budget 
mismanagement is perhaps Venezuela’s default in 1998 to the amount of $270 million 
in local bonds – even though the Venezuelan Treasury had sufficient funds, the 
payments were made a week late and, because the bonds had no grace period, the 
delay was considered a default (McLaughlin & Ellsworth 2015). Within this factor, 
Moody’s also includes political willingness to pay, a relevant example being Ecuador’s 
default in 2008. After being elected in 2007, President Rafael Correa fulfilled his pre-
election promises to repudiate the debt, and even though Ecuador had sufficient foreign 
exchange (FX) reserves, it defaulted and the bonds instantly fell 80% (Salmon 2009). 
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The third factor considered by Moody’s is fiscal strength, measured with standard 
debt burden and affordability metrics. Although the level of debt alone does not 
necessarily predict sovereign default, it certainly contributes. To measure debt burden, 
the agency includes general government debt, which captures all debt from the local, 
regional and central governments. To measure the affordability of the debt stock, the 
agency examines the size of interest payments relative to fiscal revenues. In addition to 
these quantitative measures, it has much discretion in how it assesses contingent 
liabilities, sovereign wealth funds and the overall composition of the debt stock. In its 
estimation, the agency believes over 33% of sovereign defaults have resulted from 
weak fiscal accounts. As examples of defaults driven by fiscal mismanagement, 
consider Belize in 2006, Jamaica in 2010 and Greece in 2012. 
The final factor considered is “susceptibility to event risk”, which denotes the 
general ability to respond to shocks relating to credit markets, FX or trade (Hornung et 
al. 2013:para. 1). Within this factor, there are four sub-factors. First, "political risk" 
measures the degree of uncertainty around normal political processes and elections. 
Second, "liquidity risk" codifies borrowing requirements and market-implied ratings as a 
measure of challenges a sovereign has in maintaining liquidity. Third, "banking sector 
risk" measures the size and vulnerability of the banking system. Finally, "external risk" 
captures the size and types of funding of external accounts, including the current 
account balance. Together, these four factors are believed to account for at least five 
sovereign defaults, namely Ecuador in 1999, Uruguay in 2003, Nicaragua in 2003, 
Dominican Republic in 2005 and Cyprus in 2013. As with all four major factors, 
summarized in figure 2.1, this factor involves discretion. 
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Figure 2.1: Moody’s conceptual framework for assigning sovereign ratings (Hornung et 
al. 2013:8) 
 
2.4 S&P: PHILOSOPHY AND PROCESS  
S&P is the last of the Big Three and was founded in 1860 by Henry Poor. Like 
Fitch and Moody’s, it is considered an NRSRO by the SEC. Similar to the other rating 
agencies, S&P’s philosophy is to identify, analyse and interpret the major factors that 
influence the government’s ability and willingness to pay its debts (S&P: Sovereign 
government… 2011). Unlike the other agencies, S&P has five factors that form the 
basis for sovereign credit analysis, namely institutional and political risk, economy, 
external vulnerabilities, fiscal performance and monetary performance. 
The first factor considered by S&P encompasses institutional and political risks. 
Similar to Moody’s, the political factor is not related to any specific political or economic 
ideology (democracy, command economies, etc.). The political measure captures 
institutional and political strength behind the country, including the effectiveness, 
stability and predictability of policymaking. A country with exceptionally strong political 
scores would likely be engaged in forward-thinking policymaking that can anticipate and 
respond to economic crises. Countries with top ratings would have transparent 
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institutions, as well as reliable economic and statistical data about the health of the 
economy (S&P: Sovereign government… 2011). 
The second factor reflects economic characteristics, including the wealth, 
resiliency and flexibility of the economy over the long-term. Similar to both Fitch and 
Moody’s, S&P uses forecasted measures of economic strength. Wealthier countries 
have the potential to support more taxes and, in turn, support overall credit quality. 
Moreover, faster growing economies are better able to service their debt, so S&P not 
only closely monitors overall GDP growth, but also “trend growth” that estimates 
sustainable GDP growth over multiple cycles. As with other CRAs, S&P projects GDP 
growth over multiple years and bases these estimates on government calculations, 
proprietary research and IMF projections. 
The third factor, external vulnerabilities, refers to all measures of international 
transactions that could affect creditworthiness. The three sub-factors that determine a 
country's external vulnerabilities are the status of the country’s currency, external 
liquidity and external debt levels. In the first sub-factor, sovereigns with “reserve 
currency” status benefit from global demand for this currency. Some examples include 
the US dollar, Japanese yen and euro. No EM country enjoys reserve currency status, 
but Mexico is considered sufficiently actively traded by the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS) that S&P would consider this a positive factor in its analysis of external 
vulnerabilities (S&P: Sovereign government… 2011). In the second sub-factor, S&P 
examines external financing needs, measured by current account receipts and 
international FX reserves. In the final sub-factor, S&P calculates narrow net external 
debt by subtracting liquid external assets from total external debt levels. 
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The fourth factor, fiscal score, refers to both short and long-term fiscal trends and 
associated government debt stock dynamics. Although the fiscal balance is important, 
S&P considers it amenable to political influence and therefore places significant weight 
on the simple change in general government debt stock as a percentage of GDP. As 
with the other factors, S&P projects forward government debt stocks using official 
statistics, proprietary calculations and IMF projections. On the revenue side, S&P 
examines the ability and determination of the government to maintain existing tax rates, 
broaden the tax base and implement asset sales. On the expenditure side, fiscal 
rigidities are examined for their long-term impact on basic deficits and debt stocks. 
The final factor, monetary score, combines with the other four factors shown in 
figure 2.2 and measures the ability of the central bank or other governing monetary 
institutions to control inflation, support overall economic goals and dampen economic 
crises (S&P: Sovereign government… 2011). Within this factor, the structure of the 
national exchange rate regime, presumed central bank independence and objectives 
and extent of financial market development all impact the overall score. As an example 
of a hypothetical country with an extremely strong monetary score, the monetary 
authority would have total discretion in interest rate policy, high credibility and a track 
record longer than 10 years of implementing effective policy, as well as relative control 
of inflation and inflation expectations.  
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Figure 2.2: S&P's conceptual framework for assigning sovereign ratings (S&P: 
Sovereign government… 2011) 
 
2.5 ANALYSIS ACROSS AGENCIES   
There are substantive similarities across the Big Three agencies in their rating 
philosophies and factors that help them determine sovereign ratings. In terms of 
philosophy, all three agencies focus intensely on the willingness and ability of a country 
to pay its obligations and acknowledge the inherent subjectivity of this assessment (in 
corporate analyses, a similar framework related to willingness and ability to pay is also 
used by CRAs). Each uses judgement in determining how willing the government is to 
pay its debts on time and in full. Although there are some quantitative measures to 
determine the strength of governance (IMF 2014), usually provided by the World Bank, 
each agency must exercise discretion in assessing willingness to pay. In some 
instances, it is fairly clear that willingness has deteriorated. For example, when 
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Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, gave his inaugural address in 2007, he explicitly 
stated that Ecuador’s debt is not legitimate because part of it was issued during a 
military regime (Avenger against… 2009). More recently, Greece’s former Finance 
Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, campaigned on promises to reduce the country’s debt 
burden even though it had the resources to continue to service the debt (Fidler 2015). 
With both Ecuador and Greece, each rating agency attempted to account for 
political climates and rhetoric that indicated changes in willingness to pay. In 2008, 
Moody’s downgraded Ecuador’s government bonds to “Ca” and assigned the country a 
negative outlook based on willingness to pay. Moody’s commented in the release “the 
government’s decision to default is based on ideological and political grounds and is not 
related to liquidity and solvency issues… the nature of this default, Ecuador's second in 
the past decade, is unprecedented as it is occurring in a situation of relative 
macroeconomic strength…” (Cailleteau 2008: para. 2). In S&P’s unprecedented three 
notch downgrade of Ecuador in 2008, it noted the following: “… willingness, not 
capacity, to pay is currently the overwhelming credit weakness” (Brandimarte 2008: 
para. 1). Fitch downgraded Ecuador on major concerns about willingness to pay after 
the government had identified the global bonds due in 2030 as “illegitimate” (Riordan 
2008: para. 2). Similar concerns have been voiced by all three agencies about Greece’s 
willingness to pay. 
Ability to pay is arguably the more quantitative aspect of the agency 
philosophies. The ability to pay is directly linked to each of the four or five factors 
described previously that the agencies use to assign ratings. Each agency has some 
measure of economic wealth, prosperity, diversity and growth. Similarly, each agency 
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has measures for macroeconomic policies, fiscal responsibility and monetary policy 
management. Clearly, there are broad similarities across the quantitative measures 
used to assign ratings, as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
 Philosophy       Ratings factors 
 
Fitch “Fitch’s approach to sovereign 
credit risk analysis is a synthesis of 
quantitative and qualitative 
judgments that capture the 
willingness as well as the capacity 
of the sovereign to meet its debt 
obligations” (Riley et al. 2012:1). 
 
  Discretion 
 Forecasted 
macroeconomic 
performance and 
policies 
 Structural features 
 Public finances 
 External finances 
 
Moody’s “The four rating factors in the 
scorecard may not in all cases 
constitute an exhaustive treatment 
of the considerations that are 
important for a particular sovereign 
rating and the rating may differ from 
the one applied by the scorecard 
range” (Hornung 2013:26). 
 
  Discretion 
 Forecasted economic 
performance  
 Institutional factors 
 Fiscal factors 
 Event risk 
 
S&P “... methodology addresses the 
factors that affect a sovereign 
government’s willingness and ability 
to service its debt on time and in 
full” (S&P: Sovereign government… 
2011, p. 3). 
  Discretion 
 Political risk 
 Forecasted economic 
performance  
 External factors 
 Fiscal factors 
 Monetary factors 
 
Table 2.1: Philosophies and rating factors of the Big Three agencies  
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Given these similarities across methodologies, it is therefore not surprising that the 
correlations of ratings amongst the Big Three are extremely high, as shown in figure 
2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Correlations amongst agencies for EM sovereign ratings, AAA = 100, D = 0.  
 
 There are, however, some notable differences in the means by which each 
agency arrives at a rating. First, Fitch seems to adhere to a more rigorous quantitative 
and statistically driven process, which results in extremely specific weightings for each 
of its four factors (macroeconomic potential, 10.3%, structural factors, 47.4%, external 
factors, 16.9% and public finances, 25.4%). Although the other two CRAs have a 
plethora of quantitative measures, neither specify a comparably precise weighting 
scheme. 
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 Second, Moody's seems to have been more qualitative before the global financial 
crisis, but is now moving towards a more quantitative position. In 2012, Moody's refined 
its sovereign rating methodology to become more quantitative: "… we proposed the 
following refinements to our rating methodology: enhanced quantification of sub- 
factors. We suggested increasing the usage and collective weight of quantifiable sub- 
factors that drive each factor’s scoring.…" (Hornung et al. 2013). 
 Finally, S&P has a unique approach in terms of how it combines its sub-factors 
into five main rating factors and, in turn, combines these into "profiles." S&P clearly 
uses a balance of quantitative and qualitative metrics, shown in figure 2.4. As described 
previously, there are five main sovereign rating factors for S&P: institutional 
effectiveness, economic structure, external position, fiscal flexibility and monetary 
flexibility. After a thorough review of the quantitative and qualitative determinants within 
each of the five factors, S&P assigns ratings based on a 1 to 6 scale, with "1" the 
strongest and "6" the weakest. In turn, the first two factors are combined to create the 
"political and economic profile" and the last three factors are combined to create the 
"flexibility and performance profile." Lastly, S&P uses these profiles to determine "an 
indicative rating level" (S&P: Sovereign government… 2011). 
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Figure 2.4: S&P methodology to imply rating levels from political and economic profiles 
(S&P: Sovereign government… 2011) 
 
2.6 CRASH DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 Given the agencies' supposedly forward-looking methodologies, there might be a 
broad conclusion that sovereign ratings anticipate crises. This was clearly not the case 
in the last financial crisis in 2008, in which agencies were intensely criticised over their 
late downgrades of Greece, as well as their optimistic treatment of asset-backed 
securities (ABSs). In fairness however, CRAs do not specifically attempt to anticipate 
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global crises. Rather, as shown above, the focus is primarily on anticipating default risk 
in select issuers. 
 In Greece's case, it was evident in the early fall of 2009 that the central 
government had substantially larger current fiscal deficits than it had reported, and the 
deficits in 2006 and 2007 were much larger than originally registered (Barber 2009). 
This should have driven immediate and severe downgrades. However, despite 
overwhelming evidence that multiple downgrades were necessary to reflect the 
extremely weak fiscal and debt positions, Moody's waited several months until it 
eventually downgraded. On October 20, 2009, George Papaconstantinou, the Finance 
Minister in Greece's new socialist government, stunned the world by announcing that 
the expected deficit would be over 12% (Barber 2009). However, in December 2009, 
Moody's described financial markets' concerns with Greece as "misplaced" (Creswell & 
Bowley 2011). Only 20 days later, Moody's reversed its opinion and finally downgraded 
Greece.  
 In another example of ratings failure, agencies were intensely criticised by 
economists, politicians and the broader public for their assessment of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) and other, broader types of ABSs. Indeed, the US Congress 
established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to understand the determinants of 
the crisis. The Commission (National Commission… 2011:122) noted the following: 
 
The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been 
marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors relied on them, often 
blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use them, or regulatory capital 
standards were hinged on them. This crisis could not have happened without the 
rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades 
through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms.  
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 The Commission also determined that of all the MBSs that Moody's had rated 
"AAA" (highest possible rating) in 2006, by 2010, over 70% were downgraded to junk 
status. The failure of CRAs to correctly assess the risk of these MBSs was well 
researched and verified within academia as well (Dennis 2009; Manns 2009; Pagano & 
Volpin 2010). In public forums, the criticism was sharp and frequent. The Economist 
magazine noted that "it is beyond argument that ratings agencies did a horrendous job 
evaluating mortgage-tied securities before the financial crisis hit" (Free speech… 2013, 
para. 1). 
 Although the causes of agency underperformance before and arguably during 
the crisis are many and controversial, there are perhaps three broad types of 
explanations. First, and most obviously, CRAs are paid by the issuers themselves. 
Clearly, an unfavourable rating could jeopardise revenues. Second, CRAs often have a 
mismatch in both the timing and methodology of their ratings relative to financial 
markets. In terms of timing, CRAs theoretically rate through the entire business cycle, 
lasting at least three years. Financial crises, however, can erupt in a matter of days. In 
terms of methodology mismatches, CRAs use economic statistics heavily, which often 
change slowly. GDP and other activity measures are usually reported quarterly, or even 
annually, for emerging markets (and often with a lag of one to two months). Although 
agencies purport to be forward looking and rely on their own economic projections, 
these projections often rely on official and reported economic statistics that are too 
infrequent to anticipate crises that ignite quickly. 
 Finally, there are a host of idiosyncratic reasons that suggest the last crisis was 
especially difficult to anticipate for CRAs, even relative to other crises (US tech crisis of 
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2001, Russian financial crisis of 1998, Asian financial crisis of 1997, etc.). Indeed, the 
vast majority of economists themselves did not foresee the speed, severity or duration 
of the global financial crisis. First, agency ratings are only as good as the information 
provided to them; Greece withheld critical fiscal/debt information from markets and 
statistical agencies (Timeline of a crisis… 2011). Second, it appears that agencies did 
not correctly weigh the effects of contagion in the EMU and therefore underestimated 
the impact that Greece would have on the entire monetary union. Contagion denotes an 
empirically supported phenomenon in which, in this case, news about Greece had 
significant impacts on the sovereign yields in Portugal, Ireland and Spain (Mink & De 
Haan 2013). In response to concerns about contagion, S&P re-emphasised in 2011 that 
their "scoring calibration reflects the importance of a sovereign's external and fiscal 
performance inside a monetary union relative to the rest of the zone" (S&P: Sovereign 
government… 2011). 
 How have agencies responded to criticism? Moody's (Hornung et al. 2013) 
argues as follows:  
... a review of the performance of Moody's sovereign ratings since 1983 … shows 
that our sovereign ratings accurately rank-order sovereign default risk. 
Benchmarking rating performance against actual default experience constitutes 
the strongest possible test of a rating system. The data demonstrate that, 
throughout the rating scale, higher-rated countries default significantly less 
frequently than lower-rated countries. This is true over both one-year and five-
year periods. 
 
These default rates are depicted in figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5: Five-year default rates by rating category (Hornung et al. 2013) 
  
Similarly, beginning in 2010, S&P began "to incorporate the information derived 
from the 2008-2009 global recession, particularly regarding the potential effects of 
financial sector difficulties on governments' fiscal profiles" (S&P: Sovereign 
government… 2011: para. 1). Clearly, CRAs have begun to respond to the criticism 
and, in turn, have modified their sovereign rating methodologies to incorporate lessons 
from the global financial crisis. 
 
2.7 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Even though agencies concede that ratings are subject to significant discretion, 
researchers have attempted to quantify major predictors of these ratings. The seminal 
paper on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings is arguably the Cantor and Packer 
(1996) analysis. Across 49 developed and EMs, the authors identified eight critical 
variables that jointly explained a significant amount of the sample's variation in 
sovereign credit ratings. Consistent with sovereign rating methodologies previously 
discussed, they explored several factors that impact the capacity of a country to service 
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its debt. As discussed later, almost all of the independent variables map on to one of the 
four major categories that have been identified: economic/governance strength, 
monetary policy, fiscal/debt dynamics and external vulnerabilities. Specifically, the 
authors investigated these key variables and found them to be significant and in the 
predicted directions: GDP per capita, real GDP growth, inflation, external debt, 
economic development measured by the IMF and default history.  
 Even though these six variables accounted for over 90% of the variation in 
sovereign credit ratings, it was interesting that neither fiscal balance nor external 
balance contributed significantly to most of the prediction models (although fiscal 
balance was predictive of S&P sovereign ratings). The authors identify one potential 
reason for the lack of correlation between fiscal balance and sovereign ratings, namely 
endogeneity. Lower rated countries are often forced to adopt more disciplined fiscal 
positions (e.g. Portugal and Greece from 2009 to 2014). Therefore, weaker ratings can 
perversely be associated with optically better fiscal positions.  
Another possibility for the lack of relationship between fiscal balance and ratings 
is that these balances are often subject to significant political pressure and accounting 
methods that are essentially gimmicks. For example, Brazil attempted to meet its fiscal 
surplus target in 2012 by omitting infrastructure spending, bringing forward dividends 
from state-owned banks and using funds from sovereign wealth accounts. During the 
next fiscal year, the Brazilian government delayed transfers from the energy 
development account, and delayed transfers under the Kandir Law. These delays in the 
recognition of expenditures artificially inflated the fiscal balance (Soto 2014).  
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A final possibility is that the size of the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP 
matters less than the composition of the balance, and if there are significant rigidities in 
expenditures, countries are often punished with higher risk premia. For example, in 
Brazil, pensions and salaries represent 65% of expenses and are extremely difficult to 
reduce (IMF 2015). In fact, in 2014, minimum wages were legislatively increased by 9%. 
All agencies penalise countries for these rigidities, regardless of the absolute level of 
their fiscal balances.   
 In terms of the null relationship between external balance and ratings, it is 
significantly more difficult to propose a theoretical argument. However, one explanation 
might be related to the type of funding of the current account. Normally, countries with 
significant current account balances are not necessarily punished if the excess 
investment above savings is being channelled into productive infrastructure (e.g. 
Colombia and its 5 000-km highway programme). Moreover, countries with stable 
funding for the current account through foreign direct investment, rather than less 
permanent forms of capital such as portfolio flows, are often less of a concern for CRAs 
and investors. As an example, Brazil has a significant current account balance, but 
much of it is comfortably funded through foreign direct investment. Conversely, Turkey 
also has a significant current account deficit, but most of it is funded through portfolio 
flows.  
 Despite not finding consistent results for two variables, Cantor and Packer’s 
(1996) analysis is remarkable for its foresight. In one of the best analogues of the 
original research, Eliasson (2002) produced both static and dynamic models to predict 
sovereign ratings. In the static model, the objective was to anticipate the specific credit 
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rating for a particular year. The author chose to use the same variables as Cantor and 
Packer (1996), but excluded the economic development and default history indicators. 
The R2 of the resulting model was 86%, which compares favourably to Cantor and 
Packer (1996), whose R2 ranged from 91% (in predicting Moody’s ratings) to 93% (in 
predicting S&P’s ratings).  
 In a second model, the author included four more variables to explore their 
incremental impact on explanatory power: debt/exports, export growth, short-term 
debt/reserves and interest rate spreads. Surprisingly, only debt/export registered a 
significant coefficient. Even short-term debt/reserves did not add to the existing 
predictive power of the original model. In another set of dynamic models, the author 
chose to include the most recent rating as an independent variable which, not 
surprisingly, significantly predicts future ratings. Moreover, the author investigates the 
impact of changes in independent variables on changes in ratings and in several of the 
models, the first difference of GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation and measures of 
external debt are all significant and in the predicted directions. These measures are 
consistent with many of the measures that would eventually be tested and linked 
significantly to EM sovereign credit ratings, as shown in figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: Overview of the variables examined across 10 papers on the determinants 
of sovereign ratings 
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 For example, in subsequent research by Afonso (2003) in which he used both 
linear and logistic models, it was found that for the linear models, GDP per capita, 
inflation, GDP growth, level of economic development and external debt/exports 
predicted both S&P and Moody’s sovereign ratings. Like Cantor and Packer (1996), 
measures of political risk were unfortunately not included, and this is one of the major 
weaknesses in early research. Interestingly, unlike Eliasson (2002), it was discovered 
that fiscal balance did not significantly predict ratings. Perhaps this was due to the 
aforementioned reasons, changes in the data since 1996 and 2002, or changes in the 
sample size. Indeed, Afonso (2003) tested a total of 71 developed and EM countries, 
whereas Cantor and Packer (1996) and Eliasson (2002) tested 49 and 39 countries in 
total, respectively, and these are fairly large differences in sample size. 
 Afonso (2003) deviated in a subtle way from the Cantor and Packer (1996) 
analysis by including a measure of development other than GDP per capita. Most of the 
papers since Afonso (2003) have simply used measures of wealth. However, Afonso 
(2003) included the IMF Index of Developed Countries as well, which proved prescient 
because it had a standalone correlation with sovereign ratings of 0.85, although one 
would imagine it would have had a much lower partial correlation with ratings when the 
effect of GDP per capita was included. 
 Using a linear transformation of the ratings levels, Afonso (2003) discovered that 
the model did not accurately predict countries that were strongly rated, so the author 
transformed the rating scale using logistic transformation (see figure 2.7). Because the 
author was using both developed and EM countries (ranging from Venezuela at the 
lower end to the USA/Japan at the upper), this transformation was appealing because 
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there was sufficient variance in ratings. However, it would arguably not apply to EM 
countries, which have much less spread in ratings. Afonso (2003) argues that for 
countries that are at the top of a rating scale, it takes significant improvement in rating 
factors to experience an upgrade. However, when countries are developing their 
markets, there are presumably more attainable ways of immediately improving credit 
quality, for example publishing more timely economic statistics and improving the 
transparency of fiscal and monetary decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Example of linear/logistic transformations of letter ratings versus original 
letter ratings (Afonso 2003) 
 
By using a logistic transformation, it was found that all of the earlier factors were 
similarly significant and in the expected direction, that is, GDP per capita, inflation, GDP 
growth, level of economic development and external debt/exports. For most of the 
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Singapore, Norway and Switzerland), the average prediction error was reduced by 35% 
when using a logistic transformation. 
 In a study two years later, Rowland (2004) was one of the first to investigate 
reserves as a potential determinant of credit ratings, which is surprising given its role in 
servicing external debt. This is intuitively appealing because hard-currency reserves, 
measured against GDP, would be a general proxy for the ability of a country to service 
its hard-currency debt over the long term. The next year, Rowland and Torres (2005) 
confirmed the predictive power of this measure, even when included in a regression 
with measures of GDP growth, external debt, and similar to Afonso (2003), default 
history. 
 Rowland (2004), unlike previous authors, included several measures of external 
vulnerability. Owing to the fact that large current accounts can eventually generate 
unsustainable external debt levels, this variable was included, consistent with previous 
authors. However, a measure of market openness was also included, namely trade 
openness, or the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. It could be 
hypothesised that countries with large exports, and therefore significant access to 
foreign exchange, might be able to more easily service hard currency debt. However, an 
alternative argument is that countries with significant trade exposure could be more 
vulnerable to global downturns in growth. 
 Using linear regression analysis, Rowland (2004) found fairly similar results to 
Cantor and Packer (1996), even using different time frames and countries, which 
testifies to the robustness of the earlier seminal work. The author found GDP per capita 
and debt ratios to be significant. Interestingly, GDP growth significantly predicted S&P 
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ratings, but not Moody's. Also, inflation was not a significant predictor of ratings for 
Moody’s, but did explain S&P ratings. As expected, international reserves significantly 
predicted both agencies' ratings. Trade openness predicted creditworthiness as well. 
 Perhaps as a result of Rowland (2004) including a sizable amount of factors that 
had not been tested until the author's research, there was a shift in the literature 
beginning in 2006 in which researchers began testing many more variables for their 
impact on credit ratings. They started testing other measures of economic development 
such as unemployment rate (Afonso, Gomes, & Rother 2011), while others analysed 
components of aggregate variables that had worked in previous literature (government 
revenues, instead of the overall fiscal balance, or national savings instead of current 
account balance) as well as specific measures of trade such as non-manufactured 
goods and trade dependency (Mellios & Paget-Blanc 2006).  
Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) tested several of the standard predictors of 
sovereign credit ratings. However, they added some measures that had not previously 
been tested, including the real exchange rate, investment as a percentage of GDP, 
corruption index and specific measures of government effectiveness including 
regulatory quality, accountability, rule of law and political stability. The real exchange 
rate was advanced as predicting sovereign credit ratings because it is a measure of 
trade competitiveness. Investment was expected to be positively associated with 
stronger credit ratings – more current investment should increase future growth 
potential and allow the country to more effectively manage its future debt stock. 
Although the authors did not show the pairwise correlations, it would be expected that 
investment and current account balance would, by definition, be related. Measures of 
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governance were included in the regression model and were found to be significant in 
the predicted direction (lower perceptions of corruption associated with stronger 
sovereign ratings), unlike the earlier work of Cantor and Packer (1996) and Afonso 
(2003). Real effective exchange rate, GDP, GDP per capita, inflation, trade dependency 
and government revenue were also found to be significant predictors of sovereign 
ratings. 
 Across many of the aforementioned papers, there was an interesting amount of 
agreement along two dimensions. First, many authors identified a core group of 
variables to predict sovereign credit ratings based on economic development, monetary 
stability, fiscal responsibility and external balance. Second, the majority of authors 
chose a core group of EMs that tended to be relatively large (e.g. Brazil and Mexico 
rather than Guatemala and Honduras). Perhaps larger EMs were chosen because 
sovereign credit ratings were easily available, macroeconomic data more 
comprehensive, and possibly there was some comfort in knowing that previous 
researchers had simply used a similar cannon of countries. 
 However, upon close inspection, there is clearly a persistent pattern of neglecting 
certain EMs. Unlike Cantor and Packer (1996), who investigated both developed 
markets and EMs, Eliasson (2002) focuses the analyses on only EMs. However, for 
reasons that are not clear, the analyses are limited to only a small group of EMs. Later, 
other authors also seemed to ignore the least developed EMs. After 2003, the literature 
examined an average of only three “frontier” economies per paper (Afonso 2003; 
Afonso et al. 2011; Butler & Fauver 2006; Mellios & Paget-Blanc 2006; Rowland 2004; 
Rowland & Torres 2005). 
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 The current, proposed research hopes to greatly improve upon the scope of 
coverage of EMs. Cantor and Packer (1996), Eliasson (2002) and even more recent 
researchers have often excluded many EMs from their analyses (Afonso et al. 2011; 
Butler & Fauver 2006; Mellios & Paget-Blanc 2006). For reasons that can only be 
surmised, researchers have often omitted these countries from their analyses, which 
makes them vulnerable to the criticism that their models do not, in fact, apply to all 
countries equally. Indeed, without including all possible EMs, how can one confidently 
conclude anything about the determinants of sovereign risk across these markets?  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the primary and secondary research 
objectives and the research design used to achieve these objectives. The chapter then 
explains the economic rationale for the proposed determinants of sovereign ratings, and 
concludes with the explicit research hypotheses, which are analysed empirically in 
chapter 4. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Given the relative lack of research on EM sovereign ratings in the literature, the 
primary research objective was to fill this gap by identifying and quantifying the specific 
determinants of sovereign ratings in EMs. This corresponds to hypothesis 1 described 
later in the chapter. 
Following from this primary research objective, there were two secondary 
research objectives that correspond to hypotheses 2 and 3. First, the aim of the current 
research was to explore the individual and joint impact of “governance” measures 
against EM credit ratings. Second, it attempted to quantify the interaction between the 
development of an EM, measured by GDP per capita, and the impact that governance 
measures have on credit ratings. A simple moderating effect was hypothesised: 
sovereign ratings in less developed EMs will depend even more strongly on measures 
of governance versus more developed EMs.  
The objectives were entirely focused on EM economies and their associated 
agency ratings, given the notable scarcity in this area. Given that the vast majority of 
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research on sovereign ratings has focused on developed markets, or only the largest 
EMs, the proposed research could provide an initial platform for future research on 
emerging and frontier markets. Indeed, the proposed research used a dataset with twice 
the number of EM countries versus comparable research.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 On the basis of the research objectives, the design for the model, data collection 
and subsequent analyses was considered. Several statistical models have been used to 
study the impact of economic and political variables on sovereign ratings, namely, linear 
regression and probit models. Given that the present study was focused on identifying 
the determinants of the levels of sovereign ratings, not necessarily the probability of a 
change in those ratings, probit models were inappropriate.  
Owing to the fact that the aforementioned lists of potential determinants are 
continuous variables, and sovereign ratings are routinely translated into a single 
continuous variable, linear regression was applicable. Given the primary research 
objective to quantify the determinants of multiple ratings amongst as many EMs as 
possible at one time, cross-sectional multiple regression was the chosen primary 
statistical model. This technique has been used by previous researchers of sovereign 
ratings (Afonso 2002; Cantor & Packer 1996). The general model was specified: 
 
yi = βixi1 + βixi2 +  . . . + βpxip + εi, (1) 
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where xij is the i
th observation on the jth economic variable and εi, is the stochastic term. 
The independent variables are identified in the next section and classified according to 
one of five different factor categories (economic, monetary, fiscal/debt, external and 
governance). For example, model 1a, corresponding to hypothesis 1, is specified as: 
 
Ratingi = α + β1 GDP per capita + β2 debt/GDP + β3 current account /GDP + β4 regulatory quality +  εi. (2) 
 
 One potential concern that became immediately evident with the current study’s 
focus on EMs was the availability of data, and as discussed in chapter 4, a total of 84 
countries were included in the final dataset. To determine the sufficiency of this dataset 
in using ordinary least squares regression, some assumptions were made about the 
effect size, statistical power level and number of independent variables.  
First, assumptions were made about the effect size of the proposed study on 
sovereign ratings. Effect size broadly refers to the size of the expected impact of a 
variable (or set of variables) on another. Interpretation of effect size depends on the 
type of research question and context, but for the multiple regression analysis 
proposed, the effect size f2 is  
 
 
(3) 
 
Given that the existing literature demonstrates R2 values of approximately 70%, this 
implies an effect size of ~0.6.  
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 Second, assumptions were made about the implied statistical power of the 
proposed study. Statistical power refers to the chance that an analysis will detect a 
phenomenon when there is truly a phenomenon to be detected and is primarily 
impacted by the effect size and the sample size used in the analysis (Abramowitz 
1966). The standard statistical power level desired in social research is ~0.8 (Cohen 
1988).   
Finally, assumptions were made about the number of potential determinants of 
sovereign ratings. Because there are only four major factors identified by the CRAs 
(macroeconomic/governance, monetary, fiscal/debt and external), it was assumed that 
a logical and parsimonious set of four predictors would be chosen. Given these three 
assumptions, the minimum sample size was approximately 35 countries, well below the 
size of the existing dataset.  
 Given the strength of these assumptions about the requisite size and structure of 
the data model, the dataset was subsequently constructed, as described in the next 
section. 
 
3.3 DATA SOURCE AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 The final list of potential determinants of ratings was constructed using a three-
part process, as per table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Process for selecting determinants of credit ratings  
 
In the first step of variable selection, factors were chosen based on their reliability 
across empirical studies identified in the literature review. From this, there were at least 
four major categories of variables: economic/governance, monetary, fiscal/debt 
1) Literature 
review
2) Availability 
of data
3) Economic 
rationale
Selected for 
study
Economic
Real GDP o o o o
Real GDP per capita o o o o
Real GDP growth o o o o
IMF indicator of development o o
Underdevelopment index
Unemployment (%) o o o
Employment (millions) o
Population size o
Output gap as a % of GDP o
Implied PPP conversion rate o
Monetary
Inflation (%) o o o o
Interest rates o
Fiscal/debt dynamics
Gen. govt balance/GDP o o o o
Gen. govt primary balance/GDP o o o
Gen. govt structural balance/GDP o
Gen. govt gross debt/GDP o o o o
Gen. govt net debt/GDP o o o
Govt revenue o
Govt spending o
Debt service/exports o
Debt/current acct receivables o
External
Current account/GDP o o o
Savings/GDP o o o
Investment/GDP o o o
External debt/GDP or exports o
Export growth
FX reserves to total imports
Reserves as % of M2 or GDP o
Goods as % of exports o
Trade dependency o
Governance
Govt effectiveness o o o o
Rule of law o o o o
Voice and accountability o o o
Political stability o o o
Regulatory quality o o o
Corruption o o o
X X
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dynamics and external. There was also a miscellaneous category of variables that 
included measures of market stress (sovereign spreads), monetary union membership, 
geography, real effective exchange rate and others. Extant research done from 1995 
until 2015 supported the empirical findings within each category of variables, although 
researchers differed in the operationalisation of some variables (e.g. researchers chose 
to use at least four different debt ratio denominators: GNP, GDP, exports and current 
account receivables). Subjectively, from the analysis in the literature review it seems 
that researchers struggled with operationalising measures of external vulnerability. 
 In the second step, variables were added for consideration, based on their 
availability and accessibility in public databases. A broad review of the potential 
determinants of sovereign ratings available for 180+ countries was conducted. This was 
a critical process because the research objective is to include as many EM countries as 
possible, precisely to fill the current gap in the literature. To ensure that the sovereign 
data were 1) available for as many countries as possible, 2) comparable and 3) reliable, 
IMF data were used from the World Economic Outlook. CRAs use forecasted 
projections of economic variables, and for this reason it was also critical that as many of 
the variables as possible had an associated forecast. The 26 variables that were 
available in the IMF database are listed in table 3.1 above (IMF 2015). 
 In the final step of the variable selection process, factors based on the economic 
rationale were identified and analysed, as per the discussion below.  
Real GDP growth. Stronger real economic growth should be associated with 
better sovereign ratings for a plethora of reasons. Ceteris paribus, faster growth enables 
the country to service existing debt stocks more easily. Moreover, faster growth helps 
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accommodate a growing labour market which, in turn, can provide a larger tax and non-
tax base to bolster revenues to support debt. In general, faster growth increases the 
development of a country, increases the potential for larger investments in social goods 
(education, training, etc.) and boosts investment in fixed assets that will, in turn, drive 
more future growth. Socially, faster growth can reduce the probability of class conflict 
and disruption (assuming that wealth accumulation is moderately well distributed). 
Indeed, a five percentage point collapse in growth is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of civil conflict by 50% the following year (Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti 2004).  
Obviously the source of growth matters tremendously in evaluating sovereign 
strength. If it is largely concentrated in one sector or one export, then the country is 
more vulnerable to banking, trade and balance of payments shocks. For example, Chile, 
whose copper exports account for at least 9% of GDP alone, would be more vulnerable 
to commodity price weakness than a country such as Brazil, which has much more 
diverse export and destination bases (IMF 2014). Moreover, if the growth is attributed to 
domestic credit expansion, rather than endogenous sources, then it is likely to be less 
sustainable. A case in point is Ireland, which experienced significant economic growth 
from 2003 to 2007, but credit growth was almost twice as fast as GDP growth. Despite 
these nuances, the current research expected a positive relationship between real GDP 
growth and sovereign foreign and local-currency ratings (where "positive" refers to 
faster real GDP growth associated with a stronger rating).  
GDP level. Larger economies provide commensurately larger tax bases to 
support revenues during downturns and maintain larger cyclically adjusted primary 
balances which, in turn, help sovereigns maintain lower debt stocks. Larger countries 
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tend to be more diversified as well, which can insulate them from some shocks 
(commodity or banking crises). A positive relationship was expected with ratings. 
GDP per capita. At least in purchasing power terms, this measure is an excellent 
metric of overall economic development. Agencies repeatedly cite this factor as critical 
in determining sovereign strength. Higher income is correlated with a labour market that 
is producing high value-added products, although this might not be true in commodity 
producing countries (Riley et al. 2012). Countries with more economic development 
may be more integrated with multiple countries in the global economy and, therefore, 
suffer from more reputational ramifications if they default (Bulow & Rogoff 1989). A 
positive relationship is expected with ratings. 
Unemployment rate. This is a direct measure of the potential taxability of the 
population and extent of labour utilisation. It is generally correlated with GDP level, as 
well as GDP growth, both of which impact ratings. It is also a measure of social 
discontent. A negative relationship is expected with ratings. 
Inflation rate. Given that the majority of countries globally, even within EMs, have 
adopted either an implicit or explicit inflation targeting mandate, the inflation rate is a 
measure of monetary policy efficacy. There are also direct links between lower and 
more stable inflation with better economic performance. Stable levels of lower inflation 
help boost domestic confidence and consumer activity, as well as potentially increase 
foreign direct investment. Lower levels of inflation instil confidence in local-currency 
lenders, thereby facilitating the expansion of local credit and bond markets. Although 
very low levels of inflation are associated with unique problems (suppression of 
consumption, deterioration in investment, etc.), inflation at very high levels can signal 
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rising default risk. Countries experiencing hyperinflation are often monetising their fiscal 
deficits. Lastly, inflation, like unemployment, is a measure of social discontent. High 
levels of overall inflation, and specifically food inflation, can directly and 
disproportionately harm lower socioeconomic classes. A negative relationship is 
expected with ratings. 
Fiscal balance. Large and growing fiscal deficits imply increased difficulty 
managing public spending and revenue generation (or both). Assuming domestic 
savings and foreign inflows remain constant, rising fiscal deficits cause private 
investment to decline and, in turn, reduce future GDP growth. Large fiscal imbalances, 
measured through both the basic fiscal balance and the primary balance, eventually 
drive larger debt stocks relative to GDP which, in turn, clearly heighten the risk of 
sovereign default. Larger deficits not only burden current residents, through higher 
interest payments demanded by the market, but also “future generations of taxpayers” 
tasked with eventually reducing the debt burden (Hornung et al. 2013:para. 22). A 
positive relationship is expected with ratings. 
Primary balance. Because interest payments on the existing debt stock are 
already determined by the cumulative effect of previous fiscal deficits, a useful measure 
of current fiscal efforts is the “primary balance”, which subtracts interest payments from 
current expenditures. It directly measures the current administration’s ability to manage 
the budget. Mechanically, larger primary surpluses help reduce the critical debt to GDP 
ratio, although achieving a primary balance alone, or even a small primary surplus, is 
not always sufficient. For the primary surplus to indicate relief in the debt stock, nominal 
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interest rates should be less than nominal GDP growth (IMF 1995). A positive 
relationship is expected with ratings. 
Gross debt. Gross debt is the total amount of liabilities owed by the general 
government, including central, regional and local governments, and using the IMF 
definition, debt instruments can include special drawing rights, debt securities, currency 
and deposits, loans, other accounts payable, and in some cases, insurance, pension 
and standardised guarantee schemes (IMF 2013). Gross debt includes all government 
liabilities to both residents and non-residents. Countries avoid double counting by 
consolidating all accounts within different levels of government. Countries with a larger 
existing burden of debt, and associated debt payments, are at higher risk of default. 
Debt burden is a critical measure of risk, indeed, the size of the gross debt stock “is the 
starting point of [Moody’s assessment of] fiscal strength…”  (Hornung et al. 2013:15).  
CRAs not only look at the size of the debt stock, but also examine at least three 
other debt-related factors. First, all three agencies examine the trend in the debt burden. 
Some EM countries, such as Turkey, Indonesia and the Philippines, have relatively high 
levels of debt as a percentage of GDP, but deceleration in the size of the growth stock 
has driven recent rating upgrades (Hornung et al. 2013). 
Second, agencies examine the composition of government debt. As discussed in 
the literature review, foreign-currency debt is intrinsically more volatile to service 
because of uncertainty about future FX movements. Although domestic currencies can 
appreciate and lower the foreign-currency debt burden, currency crises frequently occur 
at the same time as sovereign debt crises, and the former exacerbate the latter through 
concomitant depreciation of the local currency. High levels of foreign-currency 
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denominated debt drove the defaults in Moldova and Uruguay in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively (Hornung et al. 2013). 
Finally, agencies examine the contingent liabilities that are not directly calculated 
as gross debt. For example, large liabilities in quasi-sovereign corporations or public 
pension systems, are often considered during the debt analysis. Moreover, there are 
assets related to the service of debt payments that agencies consider, for example, 
sovereign wealth funds. Some countries, such as Chile, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait have significant public sector financial assets that could be 
used if necessary during times of acute fiscal stress. 
As with all of the aforementioned factors, this factor is not a sufficient and 
comprehensive measure of the inevitability of sovereign default. Many developed and 
emerging economies have high debt stocks, but they are considered manageable due 
to very low, and sometimes negative, associated real interest rates. For example, as of 
November 2015, Japan had a debt stock of 245% of GDP, more than $11 trillion. 
However, the interest rate on 10-year government bonds in Japan was only 0.29% at 
that time (versus 2.3% in the US). Nevertheless, as a result of the enormous debt stock 
and slow growth, S&P downgraded Japan’s sovereign debt rating in September 2015, 
following earlier downgrades by Moody’s and Fitch (Mehta 2015). Even countries with 
stellar measures of governance and institutional strength can be downgraded on debt 
concerns. A negative relationship is expected with ratings. 
Net debt. Although gross debt is one of the metrics used by the agencies, an 
adjusted measure of debt stock, namely net debt, is also likely to be predictive of 
sovereign stress because it subtracts the potential assets associated with gross debt 
 61 
 
issued by the central, regional and local governments of a country. Net debt is defined 
as the previously discussed measure of gross debt, less financial assets corresponding 
to debt instruments (IMF 2013). Financial assets would include monetary gold, currency 
and deposits, and other accounts receivable. As with the calculation of gross debt, net 
debt is based on consolidated accounts to eliminate assets and liabilities among 
different levels of the general government. 
Net debt is a more reliable measure of true accumulated fiscal burdens because 
gross debt includes intra-government debts, often implicitly. The US Congressional 
Budget Office (Elmendorf 2009:14) explains this as follows: 
 
Gross federal debt comprises both debt held by the public and debt issued to 
various accounts of the federal government, including the major trust funds in the 
budget (such as those for Social Security). Because the debt issued to those 
accounts is intra-governmental, it has no direct, immediate impact on the 
economy. Instead, it simply represents credits to the various government 
accounts that can be redeemed as necessary to authorize payments for benefits 
or other expenses. 
 
Net debt is thus often seen as being more impactful in debt burden analysis. 
Brazil is an example amongst EM countries where the difference between gross and net 
debt is significant and must be analysed thoroughly during debt sustainability analysis. 
Net debt is generally considered an incomplete picture of debt stock in Brazil (unlike in 
Chile or Colombia) because it does not capture Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
lending. Net debt does not change when the treasury issues loans to BNDES and funds 
it through public bond issuance. This is one factor that drives the growing disparity 
between the two measures of debt, as shown in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Brazil debt dynamics, 2000–2015 (IMF 2014) 
A negative relationship is expected with ratings.  
Investment. More fixed asset investment is associated with stronger future GDP 
expansion which, in turn, should drive better sovereign ratings. Higher levels of both 
public and private investment drive stronger economic growth through several channels. 
First, investment in fixed assets immediately raises domestic expenditures. Second, by 
modernising the means of production, investment can increase the overall capacity of 
an economy. Finally, investment provides leverage to the labour market and potentially 
increases productivity. Some examples of recent impactful investment programmes 
include Colombia’s 5 000 km highway infrastructure programme, Panama’s expansion 
of the Canal that will immediately allow for more taxation on even larger vessels, and 
Brazil’s proposed much-needed port infrastructure programme that will support its broad 
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export base. In Brazil, in 2013, trucks were gridlocked for 31 miles outside of one of the 
largest agricultural ports (Gomes 2014). A positive relationship is expected with ratings. 
Savings. Lower national savings rates, which include government savings, are 
directly impacted by the level of surplus or deficit run by the general government. 
Countries running increasingly large fiscal deficits will appear, ceteris paribus, to have 
lower savings rates unless there is a commensurate increase in private savings. If 
aggregate savings fall, then investment and future GDP may fall as well, which would 
be consistent with lower sovereign ratings. A positive relationship is expected with 
ratings. 
Current account. The current account deficit, as a measure of the difference 
between savings and investment, is an important measure of external vulnerability. 
When in deficit, the current account gives an approximation of the extent of capital 
imported from foreign sources. Countries that have a current account deficit are 
necessarily increasing their liabilities to other countries and these liabilities are, in turn, 
financed by financial account flows that will need to be repaid at some point. Often, 
countries that do not generate sufficient hard currency inflows because of a large 
current account deficit can experience a shortage of foreign currency necessary to 
service debt (Hornung et al. 2013). Indeed, in 1995, Mexico had major reversals in 
current account deficits when financial account flows dried up during its crisis. 
Although the size of the current account deficit is important in sovereign rating 
analysis, the source of funding is a major consideration as well. Current account deficits 
that are funded through more crisis-resistant foreign direct investment are far less 
vulnerable than deficits funded through portfolio inflows, which can quickly reverse 
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during sovereign stress. Agencies will routinely analyse the composition of the financial 
account inflows, and countries with larger and more volatile short-term financing, such 
as fixed income or equity flows, can be penalised in their sovereign rating. 
As with most economic statistics, the interpretation of the size, trend and 
composition of the current account deficit requires discretion. A large current account 
deficit implies by definition that there is a current abundance of investment relative to 
savings, which is often associated with economic growth. At other times, a large deficit 
can be attributed to a weak export base, which may be related to an overvalued 
currency or other unidentified competitiveness issue. A positive relationship with ratings 
is expected. 
Governance measures. For the purposes of this study, World Bank measures of 
global governance are used. Specifically, the World Bank produces six measures of 
governance, namely government effectiveness, voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. According to the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015:para. 
1), in the aggregate, these six concepts measure the quality and scope of governance 
across 200 countries: 
 
Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.  
 
The governance indicators draw on over 30 data sources that include household 
surveys, business surveys and NGO datasets (see table 3.2).  
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African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (ADB) 
African Electoral Index (IRP) 
Afrobarometer (AFR) 
Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (ASD) 
Business Enterprise Environment Survey (BPS) 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database (HUM) 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report (EBR) 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
Freedom House (FRH) 
Freedom House -- Countries at the Crossroads (CCR) 
Global Corruption Barometer Survey (GCB) 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCS) 
Global Insight Business Condition and Risk Indicators (WMO) 
Global Integrity Index (GII) 
Gallup World Poll (GWP) 
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (HER) 
IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments (IFD) 
iJET Country Security Risk Ratings (IJT) 
Institute for Management & Development World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) 
International Research & Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index (MSI) 
International Budget Project Open Budget Index (OBI) 
Latinobarometro (LBO) 
Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PRC) 
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS) 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index (RSF) 
US State Department Trafficking in People Report (TPR) 
Vanderbilt University's Americas Barometer (VAB) 
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (PIA) 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (WJP) 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sources for the construction of the World Bank governance indicators 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015) 
 
Each of the World Bank governance indicators is created by a multistep process. 
First, individual responses from the underlying data surveys are split into each of the six 
different conceptual topics. For example, a question from the global integrity survey 
related to bribes would be included in the calculation of the control of corruption 
measure. Importantly, because the 30+ data sources do not always cover each country, 
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the calculation of each measure for each country will often use different underlying data. 
South Africa’s government effectiveness measure includes data from the Afrobarometer 
survey, unlike Brazil or any other Latin American countries, of course.  
In the second step of creating the indicators, the individual source data are 
rescaled from 0 to 1. In the final step, the World Bank uses an unobserved components 
model to build a weighted average of the individual indicators. This model assigns 
higher weights to data sources that are more strongly correlated with each other 
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2011). 
Government effectiveness. Although this metric includes factors relating to the 
quality of public services, it is primarily focused on the quality of public and fiscal policy 
overall. Given the previous discussion on the potential for fiscal factors to determine 
sovereign ratings, as well as inflation, this factor is a prime candidate itself. It measures 
the extent of government budget management, revenue mobilisation and public 
administration. In terms of monetary factors, it measures the extent to which political 
factors influence monetary policy. Lastly, it incorporates how governments are able to 
react to crises. Namely, it reflects the speed with which government economic policies 
adapt to changes in the economy. A positive relationship for this measure, as well as 
the other five governance measures discussed below, is expected with ratings. 
Voice and accountability. CRAs rely on transparent, timely and accurate 
sovereign economic and financial statistics, and this factor attempts to gauge these 
factors. Moreover, it includes factors relating to the degree of transparency in 
policymaking, freedom of the press, effectiveness of legislation, confidence in 
policymakers and freedom of entry for foreigners. 
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Political stability and absence of violence. At the extreme, high levels of 
terrorism, protests and other conflicts can cause significant economic and financial 
disruptions. In even moderate levels, social conflict can erode domestic investment and 
confidence in the economy. This measure captures the social tensions within a country, 
as well as across regional geographies. 
Regulatory quality. CRAs examine the extent of distortionary economic policies, 
such as price controls and discriminatory tariffs. This measure aggregates several 
factors: government regulation burdens, ease of starting a new business, ease of 
investment; efficiency of competition, and the extent of regulatory burdens in a country. 
Rule of Law. Countries with a stronger, more transparent rule of law tend to 
attract greater investment and instil more confidence, driving a stronger sovereign credit 
rating. This measure includes “quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 2015:para. 3). It specifically measures property rights, 
confidence in the judicial system, the timeliness of judicial decisions, the degree of 
enforcement of court orders, intellectual property rights protection and general private 
property protection and risk of government expropriation.  
Corruption. Countries with lower levels of corruption have higher levels of trust in 
the business and economic environments which, in turn, influences foreign and 
domestic investment in the country and the subsequent sovereign rating. Corruption is 
an amorphous concept of risk that domestic economic participants, including individuals 
and companies, as well as foreign investors will encounter “public power being 
exercised for private gain” (Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015:para. 3). This 
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includes corruption among public officials, public trust in politicians, diversion of public 
funds, irregular payments in tax collection, petty corruption between local officials and 
citizens and the level of corruption between domestic and foreign companies. 
 Sovereign ratings. Given the choice of statistical modelling technique (multiple 
linear regression), sovereign ratings were translated from their letter rating into 
numerical codes according to a linear transformation. As discussed in the literature 
review, agencies not only assign a letter rating, for example, “BBB+” or “BB-“, but also a 
rating “outlook” that describes the subtle posture of the agency towards the sovereign 
rating. These outlooks are “positive”, “stable” or “negative” and are critical in 
understanding the differences between credits that are given the same letter rating. For 
example, both Romania and Russia are assigned a BBB- rating by S&P as of 2014, but 
Russia receives a negative outlook based on heightened political risk and vulnerability 
to oil prices versus Romania, which has a stable outlook. In another example, South 
Africa and Spain are both BBB+ rated countries by Fitch as of 2014, but have negative 
and stable outlooks, respectively. South Africa is given a negative outlook owing to 
vulnerabilities in the electrical grid, and weakness in major commodity export prices 
such as gold and platinum. To the author’s knowledge, the present study is the only one 
that captures these subtle but vitally important differences in ratings outlooks. 
 In total, eight sovereign rating variables were constructed. Each of the three 
CRAs assigns long-term foreign and local-currency ratings and all six of these were 
transformed, according to figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: Transformation scheme for letter ratings 
 
 The current study, unlike the extant research, accounts for subtle differences in 
letter ratings, so-called "outlooks." These outlooks are critical because they are often 
the first indicator of an imminent change in the letter rating. To include the rating outlook 
as part of the final score, the letter rating is adjusted according to the transformation 
scheme described in figure 3.3. For example, if a country is rated "BB negative" by 
S&P, it would receive a score of 52.2 for its "BB" rating less an adjustment of 2.2 for its 
negative outlook.  
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Figure 3.3: Transformation scheme for outlooks 
 
 Two aggregate measures were created. The first averaged long-term foreign-
currency ratings and outlooks of the three agencies, while the second averaged the 
local-currency ratings and outlooks of the agencies. As an example, consider the 
calculation of the average long-term foreign-currency score for Guatemala in table 3.3.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Example of calculation of average long-term foreign-currency score for 
Guatemala 
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S&P outlook Negative -2.2
S&P total 50.0
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Fitch total 56.5
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Moody's outlook Stable 0.0
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3.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on the literature review, agency methodology reports and economic 
intuition that identify potential predictors of sovereign ratings, three primary hypotheses 
were formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Measures of wealth, economic growth, monetary stability, fiscal 
prudence, balance of payments vulnerability and governance predict both EM local and 
foreign-currency credit ratings.  
 
The proposed pairwise correlations are expected to be as follows in table 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Expected pairwise correlations between factors and sovereign ratings 
 
GDP growth +
GDP level +
GDP per capita +
Unemployment rate -
Inflation -
Current account +
Investment +
Savings +
Fiscal balance +
Primary balance +
Gross debt -
Net debt -
Government effectiveness +
Voice and accountability +
Political stability +
Regulatory quality +
Rule of law +
Control of corruption +
Expected correlation (+ = associated with 
stronger sovereign ratings)
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Even if each of these individual relationships holds, it may be difficult to anticipate the 
precise multivariate model that will eventually be specified, given the mediating and 
moderating impacts of independent variables on one another. However, given that there 
are approximately four broad factors that are reliably identified in both the literature 
review and rating agency methodological papers, the current study chose one factor 
from each of these categories for the final model. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Measures of policy strength, political stability and institutional frameworks 
predict both EM local and foreign-currency ratings. 
 
Given hypotheses 1 and 2, in which stronger economic measures and better 
governance were proposed to positively impact sovereign ratings, it was compelling to 
examine potential moderating factors amongst these variables – that is, if more 
economic development and better governance predict stronger sovereign ratings, then 
how do different levels of economic development influence the extent to which 
governance, in turn, impacts ratings? Hypothesis 3 sought to answer this question. 
Even within EMs, there is significant variability in economic strength. Countries 
such as Uruguay, Greece and Argentina have GDP per capita levels that are 5-10X 
those of more “frontier markets” such as Uganda, Mozambique, India and Honduras. In 
frontier markets in which economic development is in its earliest stages, CRAs may rely 
even more on subjective measures of governance to determine sovereign strength. 
Moreover, in countries that have relatively weaker economic fundamentals, agencies 
may rely disproportionately on measures of the extent to which current distortionary 
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monetary and fiscal policies may impact future growth and, in turn, sovereign ratings. 
This rationale implies a positive interaction between the development of a country and 
measures of governance. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The lower the development of a country, the more important the 
six measures of governance become in predicting both EM local and foreign-currency 
ratings. 
  
 74 
 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the dataset used, as well as associated 
descriptive statistics. The chapter then focuses on correlation analyses amongst the 
agency ratings, and the proposed determinants of those ratings, continuing with 
inferential statistical analyses for each of the three primary hypotheses. It concludes 
with an analysis of the predictive power of the sovereign rating models, as well as a 
broader discussion of the results.  
 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A total of 89 EM countries were included in the final dataset. The dataset was not 
perfectly “balanced” and for some of the more frontier markets, such as Cuba and 
Andorra, reliable data were not available at all. Nevertheless, the final multiple 
regressions included 84 countries, well over the average of only 40 EM countries from 
papers described in the literature review. 
Based on the descriptive statistics in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, in which the set of 
EM countries is divided into approximately equal thirds based on rating, several clear 
patterns emerged. First, as expected, stronger rated countries tend to be wealthier 
(GDP per capita), with lower inflation, stronger external accounts (current account), 
better fiscal balances, lower debt burdens and better governance versus lower rated 
countries. Each of the agencies assigns ratings based on forecasted strength across 
economic and governance factors. One-year forward forecasts of each of the economic 
variables were therefore used whenever possible.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for BBB- or better countries 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for B+ to BBB- countries 
 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for B and below countries 
 
 Second, there was a high degree of intercorrelation amongst not only the three 
major agency ratings, but also within each agency’s foreign-currency (FC) and local-
currency (LC) ratings. All of the correlations amongst the six types of individual agency 
Averag
e LC 
rating
Averag
e FC 
rating
GDP 
growth
GDP 
level
GDP per 
capita
Unempl
oyment 
rate Inflation
Current 
account
Investm
ent Savings
Fiscal 
balance
Primary 
balance
Gross 
debt
Net 
debt
Govern
ment 
effectiv
eness
Voice 
and 
account
ability
Political 
stability
Regulat
ory 
quality
Rule of 
law
Control 
of 
corrupti
on
 Mean 72.4 70.8 3.5 490.5 10201.1 7.4 3.1 -2.2 25.4 23.0 -2.6 -1.3 40.1 25.4 66.3 55.5 50.4 69.4 62.7 56.8
 Median 73.2 70.3 3.2 181.9 9646.9 7.0 2.4 -1.6 24.4 21.8 -2.4 -0.8 42.1 26.0 65.5 60.5 50.5 70.5 63.5 54.0
 Maximum 88.4 85.5 7.1 4777.9 18453.0 19.6 8.6 5.4 36.6 37.7 0.4 1.6 65.3 63.4 84.0 85.0 85.0 93.0 88.0 91.0
 Minimum 60.9 58.0 1.3 12.1 1820.8 0.8 -0.2 -18.1 18.8 5.6 -11.2 -9.7 10.8 -25.5 44.0 5.0 11.0 35.0 33.0 26.0
 Std. Dev. 8.4 8.6 1.5 1004.7 4878.0 3.8 2.3 4.6 4.6 6.8 2.3 2.3 16.3 23.9 12.2 22.8 25.1 14.6 16.9 18.2
 Skewness 0.3 0.3 1.2 3.4 0.1 1.2 1.0 -1.5 0.8 -0.1 -2.1 -2.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.2
 Kurtosis 2.0 1.9 3.5 14.3 1.9 5.9 3.3 6.9 2.9 3.4 8.4 9.1 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.4 1.6 2.8 1.9 2.4
 N 26 26 26 26 26 23 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 16 26 26 26 26 26 26
Averag
e LC 
rating
Averag
e FC 
rating
GDP 
growth
GDP 
level
GDP per 
capita
Unempl
oyment 
rate Inflation
Current 
account
Investm
ent Savings
Fiscal 
balance
Primary 
balance
Gross 
debt
Net 
debt
Govern
ment 
effectiv
eness
Voice 
and 
account
ability
Political 
stability
Regulat
ory 
quality
Rule of 
law
Control 
of 
corrupti
on
 Mean 49.8 49.6 3.6 188.3 5772.9 8.0 4.2 -3.8 21.7 18.6 -4.1 -1.8 52.3 57.8 47.4 43.9 41.0 48.0 45.0 42.4
 Median 47.8 47.8 3.7 50.0 4217.1 6.5 3.4 -3.9 20.6 16.2 -3.8 -1.7 47.9 50.1 49.0 47.0 40.0 49.0 45.0 43.0
 Maximum 60.1 62.0 7.0 1672.9 19611.3 19.6 14.2 5.4 34.5 32.3 -1.3 1.8 125.0 118.0 80.0 84.0 73.0 79.0 84.0 79.0
 Minimum 43.5 42.0 -1.0 4.3 789.3 0.0 1.1 -18.1 11.3 5.8 -10.1 -7.7 13.7 27.4 12.6 8.0 5.0 17.0 11.0 3.0
 Std. Dev. 5.9 5.9 2.1 378.3 4028.6 5.9 2.8 4.6 6.2 7.0 1.9 2.0 24.6 25.2 18.2 19.7 18.1 17.3 19.2 21.7
 Skewness 0.5 0.7 -0.2 2.8 1.5 0.6 1.8 -0.6 0.4 0.3 -1.1 -0.8 0.8 1.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
 Kurtosis 1.8 2.1 2.6 10.2 5.7 2.5 7.0 4.5 2.3 2.2 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.9
 N 32 32 31 31 31 23 31 31 29 29 31 31 31 12 31 31 31 31 31 31
Averag
e LC 
rating
Averag
e FC 
rating
GDP 
growth
GDP 
level
GDP per 
capita
Unempl
oyment 
rate Inflation
Current 
account
Investm
ent Savings
Fiscal 
balance
Primary 
balance
Gross 
debt
Net 
debt
Govern
ment 
effectiv
eness
Voice 
and 
account
ability
Political 
stability
Regulat
ory 
quality
Rule of 
law
Control 
of 
corrupti
on
 Mean 35.4 35.3 3.0 77.9 4801.9 10.6 7.1 -6.3 21.6 15.6 -4.2 -1.2 66.9 83.5 38.0 45.3 38.8 39.3 35.8 34.3
 Median 37.0 37.0 3.2 20.5 3287.8 10.3 5.4 -6.4 20.7 14.8 -3.7 -1.1 55.1 76.1 36.0 43.0 44.0 39.0 29.0 32.0
 Maximum 42.4 42.4 7.1 578.7 17702.9 19.6 42.2 7.3 36.6 35.0 0.1 6.4 130.3 178.8 87.0 92.0 98.0 65.0 82.0 82.0
 Minimum 21.7 21.7 -1.0 0.8 648.2 0.5 0.0 -18.1 8.9 2.9 -11.2 -9.7 31.5 35.1 12.6 7.0 3.0 12.7 6.8 5.0
 Std. Dev. 5.2 5.2 2.4 129.5 4751.3 5.7 8.9 5.9 8.2 7.8 2.5 2.7 32.9 40.4 17.2 21.9 22.7 16.3 20.4 21.3
 Skewness -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 2.6 1.5 0.2 2.7 -0.4 0.4 0.6 -1.0 -0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.8 0.8
 Kurtosis 3.4 3.5 2.3 9.7 4.3 2.0 10.5 3.4 2.1 3.0 4.2 6.5 2.2 3.4 3.8 2.5 3.1 2.0 2.6 2.8
 N 27 27 27 27 27 17 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 13 27 27 27 27 27 27
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ratings, as well as the two aggregate ratings, were statistically significant (p < 0.01) as 
per table 4.4. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Correlations amongst rating measures 
 
4.2 HYPOTHESIS 1 
Pairwise correlations between the 18 independent variables and the eight 
dependent variables (ratings) confirmed many, but not all, of the proposed relationships. 
In other words, stronger ratings are associated with larger economies (GDP level), 
wealthier citizens (GDP per capita), lower unemployment, lower inflation, higher current 
account balances, more savings, higher fiscal balance, lower debt and better 
governance (as measured using the aforementioned six World Bank metrics). The 
proposed positive relationship between GDP growth and ratings, as well as primary 
balance and ratings, was not observed across any of the eight ratings variables as 
indicated in table 4.5. 
 
  
S&P LC 
rating
Fitch 
LC 
rating
Moody's 
LC 
rating
Average 
LC 
rating
S&P FC 
rating
Fitch 
FC 
rating
Moody's 
FC 
rating
S&P LC rating  -
Fitch LC rating 0.975***  -
Moody's LC rating 0.960*** 0.972***  -
Average LC rating 0.987*** 0.992*** 0.991***  -
S&P FC rating 0.993*** 0.972*** 0.961*** 0.985***  -
Fitch FC rating 0.976*** 0.991*** 0.975*** 0.988*** 0.980***  -
Moody's FC rating 0.960*** 0.971*** 1.000*** 0.990*** 0.961*** 0.975***  -
Average FC rating 0.983*** 0.986*** 0.992*** 0.998*** 0.988*** 0.993*** 0.992***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Correlations amongst rating measures and explanatory variables 
 
Given the tight intercorrelations amongst all eight ratings variables, there was an 
extremely high degree of concordance regarding the direction of the relationship with 
the independent variables and the agency-specific ratings variables. As indicated in 
table 4.6, the majority of the proposed relationships were in the predicted direction. 
  
S&P LC 
rating
Fitch 
LC 
rating
Moody's 
LC 
rating
Average 
LC 
rating
S&P FC 
rating
Fitch 
FC 
rating
Moody's 
FC 
rating
Average 
FC 
rating
GDP growth -0.052 -0.193 0.138 0.08 -0.022 -0.134 0.151 0.095
GDP level 0.346*** 0.312*** 0.322*** 0.326*** 0.339*** 0.341*** 0.322*** 0.327***
GDP per capita 0.540*** 0.649*** 0.461*** 0.507*** 0.553*** 0.660*** 0.469*** 0.511***
Unemployment rate -0.232 -0.222 -0.301** -0.271** -0.245* -0.198 -0.276** -0.276**
Inflation -0.271*** -0.355*** -0.391*** -0.356*** -0.287*** -0.352*** -0.375*** -0.363***
Current account 0.374*** 0.497*** 0.314*** 0.345*** 0.371*** 0.484*** 0.289*** 0.336***
Investment 0.204* 0.114 0.343*** 0.282** 0.230** 0.126 0.326*** 0.294***
Savings 0.400*** 0.409*** 0.485*** 0.445*** 0.420*** 0.412*** 0.462*** 0.448***
Fiscal balance 0.326*** 0.506*** 0.301*** 0.326*** 0.329*** 0.492*** 0.300*** 0.321***
Primary balance -0.062 0.101 -0.089 0.003 -0.081 0.093 -0.067 -0.010
Gross debt -0.441 -0.391*** -0.488*** -0.425*** -0.445*** -0.380 -0.482*** -0.427***
Net debt -0.638*** -0.636*** -0.691*** -0.668*** -0.649*** -0.624***  -0.691*** -0.668***
Govt effectiveness 0.601*** 0.663*** 0.583*** 0.607*** 0.607*** 0.668*** 0.569*** 0.597***
Voice and accountability 0.258*** 0.329*** 0.201* 0.232** 0.262** 0.333*** 0.241** 0.261***
Political stability 0.319*** 0.369*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.353*** 0.386*** 0.270*** 0.289***
Regulatory quality 0.645*** 0.649*** 0.649*** 0.654*** 0.646*** 0.654*** 0.663*** 0.668***
Rule of law 0.508*** 0.522*** 0.529*** 0.526*** 0.524*** 0.538*** 0.536*** 0.537***
Control of corruption 0.408*** 0.439*** 0.441*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.455*** 0.421*** 0.412***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Expected and actual signs of correlations between predictors and sovereign 
ratings (+ = sig. positive relationship, - = sig. negative relationship, n.s. = not significant) 
 
 With nearly all of the pairwise relationships in the predicted direction, one 
variable from each category was chosen based on 1) the strength of the linear 
relationship, and 2) the economic rationale. In the first iteration, multiple regression 
analysis was used to test the joint impact of GDP per capita, net debt, current account 
deficit and regulatory quality. The results of the regression indicated that the four 
predictors explained 83.1% of the variance in the average foreign-currency rating (R2 = 
.831, F(4, 40) = 44.162, p < 0.01), and 81.9% of the variance in the average local-
currency rating (R2 = .819, F(4, 40) = 40.710, p < 0.01). Each of the variables was 
significant and in the predicted direction, as per table 4.7. 
 
S&P LC 
rating
Fitch LC 
rating
Moody's LC 
rating
Average LC 
rating
S&P FC 
rating
Fitch FC 
rating
Moody's 
FC rating
Average 
FC rating
GDP growth + n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
GDP level + + + + + + + + +
GDP per capita + + + + + + + + +
Unemployment rate - n.s. n.s. - - - n.s. - -
Inflation - - - - - - - - -
Current account + + + + + + + + +
Investment + + n.s. + + + n.s. + +
Savings + + + + + + + + +
Fiscal balance + + + + + + + + +
Primary balance + n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Gross debt - n.s. - - - - n.s. - -
Net debt - - - - - - - - -
Government effectiveness + + + + + + + + +
Voice and accountability + + + + + + + + +
Political stability + + + + + + + + +
Regulatory quality + + + + + + + + +
Rule of law + + + + + + + + +
Control of corruption + + + + + + + + +
Expected correlation (+ = associated 
with stronger sovereign ratings)
Actual correlations
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Table 4.7: Results of regression predicting average agency foreign and local-currency 
ratings 
 
 Even though the correlation amongst all of the agency ratings is quite high, there 
is still some risk of “aggregation error” when combining several variables into one (Van 
de Vijver & Poortinga 2002). These four variables were thus regressed against each of 
the six individual measures of sovereign ratings. Interestingly, there is indeed some 
evidence of this aggregation error: for example, GDP per capita and current account did 
not reach statistical significance in the prediction of Moody’s foreign-currency rating, 
and current account was not significant in any of the individual regressions, although it 
was in the predicted direction, as shown in tables 4.8 and 4.9. 
 
  
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 41.955*** 4.560 42.225*** 4.935
Regulatory quality 0.354*** 0.088 0.441 0.384*** 0.096 0.457
GDP per capita 0.001* 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.154
Net debt  -0.225*** 0.031 -0.544  -0.233*** 0.033 -0.539
Current account 0.435* 0.254 0.124 0.474* 0.274 0.129
Countries 41 41
R
2
0.831 0.819
Adj-R
2
0.812 0.799
SE 6.914 7.482
Durbin-Watson 2.438 2.465
F-statistic 44.162*** 40.710***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 1a: Average FC rating Model 1b: Average LC rating
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Table 4.8: Results of regression predicting the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch foreign-currency 
ratings   
 
 
Table 4.9: Results of regression predicting the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch local-currency 
ratings   
 
 Although the previous regression has excellent predictive power relative to 
models published in other research (Afonso 2003; Afonso et al. 2011; Butler & Fauver 
2006; Mellios & Paget-Blanc 2006; Rowland 2004; Rowland & Torres 2005), it has a 
disappointing sample size of only 41 countries because few countries report net debt. 
Even though net debt would be the preferred measure of sovereign weakness indicated 
by both economic intuition and the bivariate correlations in table 4.5 there is still a 
B SE of B β B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 42.559*** 4.682 39.187*** 5.549 42.96*** 4.720
Regulatory quality 0.313*** 0.090 0.416 0.415*** 0.108 0.457 0.304*** 0.090 0.451
GDP per capita 0.001* 0.000 0.226 0.001 0.000 0.163 0.001* 0.000 0.247
Net debt  -0.204*** 0.030 -0.533  -0.258*** 0.037 -0.560  -0.181*** 0.035 -0.443
Current account 0.377 0.283 0.102 0.287 0.283 0.076 0.251 0.313 0.070
Countries 39 38 32
R
2
0.821 0.833 0.824
Adj-R
2
0.800 0.813 0.798
SE 6.747 7.7 6.256
Durbin-Watson 2.481 2.731 1.892
F-statistic 38.901*** 41.097*** 31.660***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 1c: S&P FC rating Model 1d: Moody's FC rating Model 1e: Fitch FC rating
B SE of B β B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 41.828*** 5.536 39.090*** 5.568 43.643*** 5.349
Regulatory quality 0.374*** 0.106 0.459 0.425*** 0.109 0.471 0.357*** 0.102 0.491
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.178
Net debt  -0.211*** 0.036 -0.511  -0.254*** 0.037 -0.555  -0.199*** 0.040 -0.454
Current account 0.393 0.335 0.099 0.35 0.292 0.092 0.257 0.354 0.066
Countries 39 37 32
R
2
0.785 0.835 0.807
Adj-R
2
0.759 0.814 0.778
SE 7.977 7.726 7.091
Durbin-Watson 2.478 2.726 1.643
F-statistic 30.984*** 40.376*** 28.181***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 1f: S&P LC rating Model 1g: Moody's LC rating Model 1h: Fitch LC rating
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strong correlation between net debt and gross debt (r = 0.94, p < 0.01) and there is a 
similarly strong correlation between gross debt and sovereign ratings (r = -0.31 to -0.38 
depending on the ratings specification, p < 0.05).  
Hence consistent with the primary research objective of identifying the 
determinants of ratings amongst as many EMs as possible, the decision was made to 
respecify the regression using gross debt instead of net debt. When the regressions 
were rerun, the sample size doubled to 84 countries and the four predictors explained 
70.1% of the variance in the average foreign-currency rating (R2 = .701, F(4, 84) = 
46.358, p < 0.01) and 69.9% of the variance in the average local-currency rating (R2 = 
.699, F(4, 84) = 45.795, p < 0.01), as per table 4.10.  
 
 
Table 4.10: Results of regression predicting average agency foreign and local-currency 
ratings 
 
 The regressions using individual measures from each agency showed 
remarkable robustness, and across all six measures, the determinants of ratings were 
significant and in the predicted direction, as shown in tables 4.11 and 4.12.  
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 41.760*** 3.326 42.109*** 3.465
Regulatory quality 0.387*** 0.060 0.500 0.403*** 0.062 0.502
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.000 0.243 0.001*** 0.000 0.234
Gross debt  -0.249*** 0.036 -0.437  -0.256*** 0.038 -0.432
Current account 0.555*** 0.190 0.187 0.610*** 0.197 0.198
Countries 84 84
R
2
0.701 0.699
Adj-R
2
0.686 0.683
SE 8.779 9.147
Durbin-Watson 1.578 1.568
F-statistic 46.358*** 45.795***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 2a: Average FC rating Model 2b: Average LC rating
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Table 4.11: Results of regression predicting the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch foreign-
currency ratings   
 
 
Table 4.12: Results of regression predicting the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch local-currency 
ratings   
 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS 2 
As indicated in table 4.5 there are extremely strong correlations 1) amongst each 
of the six governance measures, and 2) between each governance measure and 
sovereign ratings. It was thus expected that hypothesis 2 would also be evidenced in 
regression analyses. 
B SE of B β B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 44.603*** 3.468 43.006*** 3.712 47.28*** 3.337
Regulatory quality 0.316*** 0.065 0.417 0.423*** 0.066 0.510 0.234*** 0.062 0.353
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.000 0.301 0.001*** 0.000 0.209 0.001*** 0.000 0.382
Gross debt  -0.233*** 0.035 -0.443  -0.307*** 0.041 -0.487  -0.182*** 0.037 -0.355
Current account 0.599*** 0.191 0.208 0.435** 0.205 0.138 0.675*** 0.220 0.230
Countries 75 85 61
R
2
0.710 0.705 0.729
Adj-R
2
0.694 0.689 0.710
SE 8.335 9.444 7.312
Durbin-Watson 1.640 1.751 1.766
F-statistic 42.896*** 44.224*** 37.678***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 2c: S&P FC rating Model 2d: Moody's FC rating Model 2e: Fitch FC rating
B SE of B β B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 44.671*** 3.752 43.631*** 3.952 48.954*** 3.774
Regulatory quality 0.348*** 0.070 0.432 0.418*** 0.071 0.497 0.247*** 0.071 0.342
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.000 0.276 0.001** 0.000 0.204 0.001*** 0.000 0.369
Gross debt  -0.242*** 0.038 -0.434  -0.307*** 0.043 -0.488  -0.194*** 0.040 -0.356
Current account 0.656*** 0.206 0.215 0.492** 0.225 0.150 0.763*** 0.238 0.245
Countries 75 74 60
R
2
0.699 0.702 0.722
Adj-R
2
0.682 0.684 0.702
SE 9.020 9.703 7.919
Durbin-Watson 1.676 1.790 1.372
F-statistic 40.709*** 40.545*** 35.689***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 2f: S&P LC rating Model 2g: Moody's LC rating Model 2h: Fitch LC rating
 83 
 
 To test the joint impact of all six measures of governance against local and 
foreign-currency average ratings, a multiple regression analysis was performed. The 
results of the regression in table 4.13 indicated that the six predictors explained 52.0% 
of the variance in the average foreign-currency rating (R2 = .520, F(6, 80) = 13.165, p < 
0.01), and 51.1% of the variance in the average local-currency rating (R2 = .511, F(6, 
79) = 12.542, p < 0.01). When controlling for the cumulative effects of all other 
variables, government effectiveness and regulatory quality were significant and in the 
predicted direction. In Model 3a, control of corruption and voice and accountability have 
coefficients opposite to the predicted directions and that are significant at the 5% and 
10% level, respectively. In Model 3b, government effectiveness and regulatory quality 
continued to be significant and in the predicted direction, while voice and accountability 
was significant at the 5% level, but in the opposite direction that was predicted. 
 
 
Table 4.13: Results of regression predicting average agency foreign and local-currency 
ratings 
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 24.987*** 3.773 25.194*** 3.969
Voice and accountability  -0.133* 0.083 -0.189  -0.150** 0.089 -0.202
Political Stability -0.003 0.082 -0.004 -0.009 0.087 -0.013
Government effectiveness 0.316*** 0.140 0.398 0.372*** 0.150 0.457
Regulatory quality 0.458*** 0.119 0.603 0.447*** 0.128 0.560
Rule of law 0.056 0.164 0.077 0.024 0.173 0.032
Control of corruption  -0.209** 0.124 -0.297 -0.188 0.132 -0.259
Countries 80 79
R2 0.520 0.511
Adj-R2 0.480 0.470
SE 10.996 11.462
Durbin-Watson 2.000 1.931
F-statistic 13.165*** 12.542***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 3a: Agency FC Average Total Model 3b: Agency LC Average Total
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Even with the two variables removed that were not significant in model 3a, namely 
political stability and rule of law, the subsequent regressions in models 4a and 4b 
continued to show counterintuitive relationships between voice and accountability, as 
well as control of corruption, and sovereign ratings as per table 4.14. 
 
 
Table 4.14: Results of regression predicting average agency foreign and local-currency 
ratings 
 
4.4 HYPOTHESIS 3 
Analyses for hypotheses 1 and 2 quantified the relative impact of stronger 
economic and governance measures on sovereign ratings. To test the final hypothesis 
that different levels of economic development impact the extent to which governance 
measures influence ratings, multiple regression analyses were used with interaction 
effects. The results across models 6 to 11, in the appendix, indicate the absence of 
interaction effects. Levels of economic development and governance do not measurably 
impact the other’s effect on sovereign ratings, at least in the current dataset. 
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 24.742*** 3.617 25.058*** 3.837
Voice and accountability  -0.129** 0.075 -0.183  -0.152** 0.080 -0.204
Government effectiveness 0.333*** 0.129 0.419 0.379*** 0.136 0.465
Regulatory quality 0.473*** 0.109 0.623 0.453*** 0.120 0.569
Control of corruption  -0.188*** 0.096 -0.267  -0.182** 0.102 -0.251
Countries 80 79
R
2
0.519 0.511
Adj-R
2
0.493 0.484
SE 10.858 11.308
Durbin-Watson 2.021 1.932
F-statistic 20.225*** 19.321***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 4a: Average FC rating Model 4b: Average LC rating
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4.5 ACCURACY ANALYSES 
Given the high R2 of models 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, further analyses were conducted 
to examine the in-sample accuracy. These residual analyses were done in three steps, 
proceeding from an aggregate level of data analysis down to a country-specific level. 
First, the models were examined for their ability to anticipate existing ratings. Second, 
residuals were analysed for their behaviour across different rating categories. Finally, 
six countries whose ratings were most poorly predicted were examined for potential 
reasons for the disparity between actual and fitted ratings. 
Models 1a and 1b, specified using regulatory quality, GDP per capita, net debt 
and current account to predict the variation in foreign and local-currency sovereign 
ratings, respectively, performed well in accuracy tests. Models 1a and 1b have fitted 
ratings that are within two notches of the actual rating in 82.9% and 78.0% of the 
sample, respectively. Models 2a and 2b have fitted ratings that are within two notches of 
the actual rating in 73.8% and 69.0% of the sample, respectively, as described in table 
4.15 and figure 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.15: Accuracy of regression models in predicting actual ratings 
  
Difference between 
fitted rating vs actual 
rating Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Less than 1 notch 34.1% 36.6% 34.5% 40.5%
Between 1-2 notches 48.8% 41.5% 39.3% 28.6%
More than 2+ notches 17.1% 22.0% 26.2% 31.0%
Countries 41 41 84 84
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Figure 4.1: Relative accuracy of regression models in predicting actual ratings 
 
Overall, the average absolute values of the residuals for models 1a, 1b, 2a and 
2b were 5.5, 5.9, 6.7 and 7.1 respectively (on a scale of 0-100; see figure 3.2). Given 
the linear transformation that specifies that a one-notch difference is equivalent to “4.3” 
in the transformed rating scale, the models performed exceptionally well. With the 
normal caveats of aggregation errors, the models were usually within 1-2 rating 
notches.  
Disaggregating the results further, there is a positive correlation between model 
1a residuals and actual foreign-currency rating (r = 0.42, p < 0.01) as well as model 1b 
residuals and actual local-currency rating (r = 0.34, p < 0.05), noted in table 4.16. 
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Table 4.16: Correlation amongst model residuals and actual ratings 
 
Optically, models 1a and 1b seem to perform best for EM countries that are moderately 
rated (see figure 4.2).  
 
  
Figure 4.2: Model residuals versus actual foreign and local-currency ratings 
 
Similarly, there is a positive correlation between model 2a residuals and actual foreign-
currency rating (r = 0.546, p < 0.01) as well as model 2b residuals and actual local-
currency rating (r = 0.548, p < 0.01), shown in table 4.17.  
Model 1a 
residual
Model 1b 
residual
Average foreign-
currency rating
Model 1a residual  -
Model 1b residual 0.995***  -
Average foreign-currency rating 0.411*** 0.331**  -
Average local-currency rating 0.421*** 0.341** 0.998***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 4.17: Correlation amongst model residuals and actual ratings 
 
Models 2a and 2b also seem to perform best in moderately rated EM countries as per 
figure 4.3.  
 
-   
Figure 4.3: Model residuals versus actual foreign and local-currency ratings 
 
As shown in table 4.18, in which countries are sorted from the largest to smallest 
absolute value of residuals of model 1a, several countries are identified with 
exceedingly large residuals. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, is overrated (model 
Model 2a 
residual
Model 2b 
residual
Average foreign-
currency rating
Model 2a residual  -
Model 2b residual 0.994***  -
Average foreign-currency rating 0.547*** 0.543***  -
Average local-currency rating 0.546*** 0.549*** 0.998***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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rating is stronger than actual rating) by three notches. According to the model, Bosnia-
Herzegovina is rated to be approximately a BB sovereign (a rating code of ~50), but it is 
rated much lower, near B- (a rating code of ~37). Morocco and Mexico are both 
underrated by over two notches, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as the 
Dominican Republic, were both overrated by nearly 2.5 notches as well. Actual ratings, 
fitted ratings and residuals by country for models 1a and 1b are provided in table 4.17, 
while model 1a and 1b residuals are summarized in figures 4.4 and 4.5.  
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Table 4.18: Actual ratings, fitted ratings and residuals by country for models 1a and 1b 
 
 
Actual foreign-
currency rating
Actual local-currency 
rating
Model 1a fitted 
rating
Model 1b fitted 
rating
Absolute value, 
Model 1a residual
Absolute value, 
Model 1b residual
Bosnia-Herzegovina 36.961 36.961 50.011 50.865 13.050 13.904
Morocco 59.423 60.873 47.204 48.206 12.220 12.667
Mexico 71.017 75.364 59.911 61.047 11.106 14.317
St. Vincent 32.614 32.614 43.296 43.614 10.683 11.001
Dominican Republic 44.932 44.932 54.979 55.904 10.048 10.973
Bulgaria 60.873 62.322 70.864 72.783 9.991 10.462
Greece 26.093 26.093 35.357 34.904 9.265 8.812
Bolivia 50.728 50.728 42.392 42.631 8.336 8.097
Mauritius 69.568 69.568 61.742 63.124 7.826 6.444
Ukraine 25.006 25.006 32.761 32.937 7.756 7.931
Ghana 34.788 34.788 42.444 43.284 7.657 8.496
Panama 65.220 65.220 57.754 58.348 7.466 6.872
Colombia 65.220 68.118 57.766 59.154 7.454 8.964
South Africa 63.046 67.394 55.651 56.869 7.395 10.524
Vietnam 46.381 46.381 39.174 39.612 7.207 6.769
Macedonia 51.091 51.091 57.883 59.306 6.793 8.215
Costa Rica 54.351 54.351 60.877 61.921 6.526 7.569
Lebanon 35.512 35.512 29.042 28.095 6.471 7.417
Cape Verde 39.135 39.135 33.295 33.683 5.840 5.452
Uruguay 63.771 65.220 68.955 69.813 5.184 4.593
Brazil 57.974 59.423 53.090 53.793 4.884 5.630
Peru 71.017 73.915 66.200 67.937 4.817 5.978
Turkey 57.974 60.873 62.764 63.977 4.790 3.104
Egypt 36.961 36.961 32.266 32.170 4.695 4.791
Hungary 57.250 58.699 61.812 63.031 4.562 4.332
Zambia 39.135 39.135 43.602 44.268 4.467 5.133
Chile 85.508 88.407 81.102 83.137 4.406 5.270
Poland 76.089 78.987 71.945 73.470 4.144 5.517
Portugal 57.250 57.250 53.623 53.846 3.627 3.404
Latvia 73.915 73.915 71.233 72.644 2.682 1.271
Lithuania 73.915 73.915 76.082 77.637 2.167 3.722
Pakistan 36.961 36.961 39.065 39.547 2.104 2.586
Serbia 44.207 44.207 46.311 47.115 2.104 2.908
Fiji 43.483 43.483 45.533 45.944 2.050 2.462
Albania 42.396 42.396 44.364 45.039 1.968 2.643
Jordan 45.656 45.656 43.822 44.406 1.834 1.251
Kazakhstan 65.945 67.394 67.210 68.211 1.265 0.818
Estonia 84.059 84.059 85.069 86.839 1.009 2.780
Belize 31.527 31.527 30.854 30.656 0.673 0.871
Kenya 42.033 43.483 41.571 42.185 0.463 1.298
Cameroon 39.135 39.135 39.241 39.494 0.106 0.359
 91 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Model 1a residuals 
 
Figure 4.5: Model 1b residuals 
 
As per table 4.19, in which countries are sorted from the largest to smallest absolute 
value of residuals of model 2a, China, India, Moldova, Venezuela and Barbados emerge 
as the most misrated countries. Model 1a and 1b residuals are summarized in figures 
4.6 and 4.7.  
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Table 4.19: Actual ratings, fitted ratings and residuals by country for models 2a and 2b 
Actual foreign-
currency rating
Actual local-
currency rating
Model 2a fitted 
rating
Model 2b fitted 
rating
Absolute value, 
Model 2a 
residual
Absolute value, 
Model 2b 
residual
China 85.508 85.508 55.959 56.902 29.550 28.607
Greece 26.093 26.093 48.643 49.299 22.551 23.206
India 61.597 61.597 39.880 40.307 21.717 21.290
Moldova 32.614 32.614 49.295 49.885 16.681 17.271
Venezuela 21.745 21.745 37.830 37.997 16.085 16.252
Barbados 34.788 34.788 49.549 49.989 14.761 15.201
Papua New Guinea 41.309 41.309 55.718 56.955 14.409 15.647
Bolivia 50.728 50.728 38.555 38.684 12.173 12.045
Morocco 59.423 60.873 47.480 48.180 11.944 12.693
Bosnia-Herzegovina 36.961 36.961 48.887 49.343 11.926 12.382
Argentina 30.440 30.440 42.220 42.332 11.780 11.892
Burkina Faso 34.788 34.788 46.548 46.962 11.760 12.174
Dominican Republic 44.932 44.932 56.675 57.492 11.743 12.560
Brazil 57.974 59.423 46.569 47.045 11.406 12.378
Mexico 71.017 75.364 60.890 61.884 10.127 13.481
Angola 44.932 44.932 34.899 34.874 10.032 10.058
Georgia 48.555 48.555 58.533 59.349 9.979 10.795
Slovakia 81.161 81.161 71.616 72.910 9.545 8.250
St. Vincent 32.614 32.614 41.878 41.739 9.264 9.126
Costa Rica 54.351 54.351 63.592 64.563 9.240 10.212
Cape Verde 39.135 39.135 30.352 30.416 8.783 8.719
Lebanon 35.512 35.512 26.767 26.033 8.745 9.479
Oman 77.176 77.176 68.867 69.325 8.309 7.850
Colombia 65.220 68.118 57.043 57.898 8.177 10.221
Macedonia 51.091 51.091 59.206 60.150 8.115 9.059
Rwanda 43.483 43.483 51.216 51.777 7.733 8.295
Vietnam 46.381 46.381 38.748 39.132 7.633 7.248
El Salvador 44.932 43.483 52.562 53.400 7.630 9.917
Egypt 36.961 36.961 29.388 29.326 7.573 7.635
Armenia 44.569 44.569 52.104 52.771 7.535 8.202
Belarus 31.527 31.527 39.047 39.097 7.520 7.570
Malaysia 74.640 77.538 67.333 68.694 7.307 8.844
Nicaragua 39.135 39.135 46.284 46.661 7.149 7.526
Thailand 69.568 72.466 62.451 63.845 7.116 8.621
South Africa 63.046 67.394 56.032 56.856 7.014 10.538
Hungary 57.250 58.699 64.195 65.531 6.945 6.833
Bangladesh 47.830 47.830 40.910 41.282 6.920 6.548
Czech Republic 84.059 86.958 77.407 78.882 6.652 8.075
Peru 71.017 73.915 64.441 65.549 6.576 8.366
Kazakhstan 65.945 67.394 59.512 60.241 6.433 7.152
Ghana 34.788 34.788 41.081 41.414 6.294 6.627
Bulgaria 60.873 62.322 67.114 68.443 6.241 6.122
Philippines 64.495 65.945 58.337 59.572 6.158 6.373
Panama 65.220 65.220 59.265 59.830 5.955 5.390
Ukraine 25.006 25.006 30.768 30.912 5.762 5.907
Poland 76.089 78.987 70.334 71.637 5.754 7.350
Mozambique 37.686 37.686 32.072 31.652 5.614 6.034
Turkey 57.974 60.873 63.473 64.424 5.499 3.551
Mauritius 69.568 69.568 64.217 65.274 5.351 4.293
Tunisia 47.830 50.004 42.681 42.948 5.149 7.056
Estonia 84.059 84.059 89.160 90.965 5.101 6.906
Indonesia 60.148 60.148 55.428 56.288 4.720 3.860
Botswana 76.089 76.089 71.439 72.899 4.650 3.190
Romania 60.873 62.322 65.403 66.575 4.531 4.253
Montenegro 44.569 43.483 40.105 39.884 4.465 3.599
Russia 55.800 57.250 59.920 61.037 4.119 3.787
Chile 85.508 88.407 81.441 83.068 4.068 5.339
Zambia 39.135 39.135 42.721 43.165 3.586 4.030
Cambodia 39.135 39.135 42.670 42.818 3.535 3.683
Jordan 45.656 45.656 42.291 42.624 3.365 3.032
Nigeria 45.656 47.105 48.976 49.564 3.320 2.458
Guatemala 52.902 54.351 55.953 56.820 3.051 2.468
Ecuador 37.686 39.135 40.567 40.742 2.881 1.607
Croatia 51.453 52.902 54.169 55.090 2.716 2.188
Senegal 44.569 44.569 41.984 42.403 2.585 2.166
Honduras 40.222 40.222 42.621 42.933 2.399 2.711
Lithuania 73.915 73.915 76.115 77.500 2.200 3.585
Belize 31.527 31.527 29.401 29.252 2.126 2.274
Suriname 47.830 47.830 45.796 45.932 2.034 1.898
Portugal 57.250 57.250 55.286 56.140 1.963 1.110
Kenya 42.033 43.483 40.120 40.287 1.914 3.196
Serbia 44.207 44.207 45.723 46.272 1.516 2.064
Gabon 44.207 44.207 45.674 45.939 1.467 1.732
Fiji 43.483 43.483 44.869 45.162 1.386 1.679
Albania 42.396 42.396 43.713 43.856 1.317 1.460
Jamaica 34.788 34.788 35.931 36.282 1.144 1.494
Latvia 73.915 73.915 74.837 76.178 0.922 2.263
Sri Lanka 44.932 45.656 44.033 44.600 0.899 1.057
Cameroon 39.135 39.135 38.439 38.582 0.696 0.553
Uruguay 63.771 65.220 63.078 63.936 0.693 1.284
Paraguay 54.351 54.351 54.868 55.672 0.517 1.321
Azerbaijan 60.148 60.148 59.706 60.779 0.442 0.631
Pakistan 36.961 36.961 37.378 37.746 0.417 0.785
Uganda 42.033 42.033 41.638 41.755 0.396 0.278
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Figure 4.6: Model 2a residuals 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Model 2b residuals 
 
 
Given these outliers in the regressions, three countries with large misratings from 
model 1a and three countries with large misratings from model 2a were chosen, and 
recent reports from each agency on these countries were examined to understand how 
the fitted ratings differed from the actual ratings. Recall that the two primary differences 
between models 1a and 2a were that the former uses net debt and has 41 countries 
under coverage, while the latter uses gross debt and thereby expands the dataset to 84 
countries. Both models use regulatory quality, GDP per capita and current account. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. This country is overrated by three notches in model 1a. 
S&P (Dimitrievska 2015) describes its rationale in the first paragraph of its latest update: 
 
The ratings on Bosnia-Herzegovina are constrained by our view of its fragile, 
overlapping government institutions, its weak fiscal management framework, and 
its vulnerable external position arising from persistent current account deficits. 
The ratings are supported by our expectation of continued and significant 
international support.  
 
The parallel between the first paragraph of the rating rationale and model 1a 
specification is remarkable. The model precisely specifies the first three factors explicitly 
mentioned by S&P, these being government institutional strength, fiscal/debt 
management and external vulnerabilities.  
However, the model clearly does not account for the “continued and significant 
international support”, which is a reference to a standby arrangement provided by the 
IMF in 2012 (Bosnia and Herzegovina… 2012). Another possible reason for the large 
overrating by the model is that even though it includes a measure of the level of wealth 
(GDP per capita), it excludes GDP growth, which has been depressed in the country 
since floods destroyed infrastructure worth at least 15% of GDP (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina… 2012). Clearly these idiosyncratic characteristics contributed to the 
substantial overestimation of sovereign strength. 
Morocco. This country is underrated by over two notches in model 1a. In the 
2014 assessment, S&P describes Morocco’s vulnerabilities related to “disappointing 
economic growth” and large fiscal and current account deficits. Although model 1a 
would capture some measures of cumulative fiscal restraint over time (net debt), it 
 95 
 
would not capture the specific snapshot of budget management. However, the agency 
expects both fiscal and current account deficits to narrow. Even though the model uses 
forecasted one-year ahead values provided by the IMF, the agency is more constructive 
on these accounts and this likely results in the model underestimating sovereign 
strength (S&P says ratings… 2014).  
Mexico. This country is underrated by over two notches in model 1a. There are at 
least two possibilities for the underestimation of sovereign rating for Mexico. First, by 
examining the S&P report in December 2013, it is evident that the analysts emphasised 
energy reform. For the first time in 75 years, Mexico began to permit private investment 
into its oil and gas infrastructure and S&P described this as “a watershed moment” 
(Bases & Alper 2013:para. 3). This key piece of legislation was perceived to be critical 
in catalysing long-term growth, supporting fiscal accounts and helping the country build 
more international reserves. Only days after the approval of the energy bill, S&P 
upgraded Mexico by one full notch. 
 A second potential reason for the underestimation is described in Moody’s report 
of February 2014, in which Mexico was upgraded one full notch from Baa1 to A3. In this 
case, the agencies expected comprehensive reforms beyond the energy sector. 
Moody’s contended that “the approval of a comprehensive package of reforms 
significantly increases the probability that the Mexican government will achieve a 
material improvement in economic and fiscal prospects over the medium to long term, 
providing additional impetus to the so-called 'Mexico's momentum' in the near to 
medium term” (Leos-Lopez 2014:para. 5). Although the models capture the quality of 
governance, they likely underestimate the perceived potential for reforms to impact 
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growth, fiscal accounts and debt sustainability for Mexico and therefore underestimate 
sovereign strength. 
China. This country is underrated by over six notches in model 2a. Remarkably, 
China was rated a BBB- country by the model, when it is actually rated AA-, A+ and Aa3 
by S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. This was the largest mis-rating across all 
models and there are several immediately evident causes. First, even though China has 
a relatively low GDP per capita, it has phenomenally strong growth (IMF forecasting 
GDP growth at 6.8% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016), which the model omits (Milhench 
2015). Second, it has many sovereign strengths other than GDP growth in parameters 
that were not included in the models: GDP level ($8.2 trillion, largest amongst EMs); 
very low unemployment rate (4%); and high investment rate (36% of GDP, largest 
amongst EMs). Clearly if these variables were included in the models, China would be 
ranked much stronger. 
Greece. Overrated by five notches in model 2a. Greece is not overrated on 
account of its strength in its economic metrics, many of which are relatively weak 
(highest gross debt and net debt measures in the sample). However, the model does 
not anticipate the extent of political tension in the country. In January 2015, a populist 
government was elected on the premise of renegotiating the existing IMF/World 
Bank/ECB bailout programme and associated debt. The election, and subsequent 
behaviour of the primary policymakers, Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, forced 
CRAs (and financial markets) to seriously question the “willingness to pay” of the new 
government (Ball, Zampano, & Moloney 2015; Fidler 2015). This, in turn, precipitated a 
wave of five downgrades over 12 months (Pitas 2015).  
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 India. This country is underrated by five notches in model 2a. As with Greece, the 
primary driver of misrating is a set of qualitative reasons pertaining to governance, In 
2014, newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi detailed an aggressive set of fiscal 
and economic reforms to boost investment, private sector involvement and growth. 
Modi’s agenda included promises to invest heavily in infrastructure projects and 
privatise state-run companies, such as Coal India, as well as continue to permit the 
Reserve Bank of India relative autonomy (Nam 2014). In issuing India’s credit rating, 
Nam (2014:para. 1) from S&P described the basic rationale: 
Crucial factors include higher growth in real GDP per capita, stronger fiscal and 
debt metrics and a stronger external position or improved monetary policy 
setting, and the government's ability to fulfil its promises on key reforms will be 
critical to the country's success.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the overall research objective and the extent 
to which the general findings achieved that objective. The chapter then explains how the 
findings of the current study could impact both policymakers and academic researchers. 
Suggestions are also made for possible future research. 
 
5.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS 
 The literature review in chapter 2 demonstrated that extant studies lack empirical 
attention to emerging-market sovereign ratings. This is indeed an unusual gap in the 
literature, given the profound importance of sovereign ratings in global financial 
markets.  
Simply having a sovereign rating increases foreign investment by 2% per annum 
(Minto 2013). Indeed, in 2002, the US government agreed to fund new sovereign ratings 
for 20 sub-Saharan African countries and after a competitive bidding process, the 
contract was awarded to Fitch. The US Secretary of State remarked that “by attaining a 
sovereign credit rating, your country will help reduce risk and encourage investment. 
Sovereign credit rating gives courage to capital” (Bhatia 2002:52).  
Stronger sovereign ratings impact both the “real economy” and financial markets. 
Carrying an investment-grade rating reduces sovereign bond spreads by 35% (Jaramillo 
& Tejada 2011). Rating downgrades can immediately drive up the cost of funding for a 
country. As a simple example, consider the S&P downgrade of Brazil in September 
2015. This was associated with a rise in the 10-year bond of over 0.8%, which if 
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sustained, translates into billions of dollars in extra interest on Brazil’s existing federal 
public debt stock of $116 billion. Sovereign downgrades often lead to corporate and 
banking sector downgrades which, in turn, can paralyse domestic capital markets. 
Lastly, because many international bond investors can only hold sovereign debt that is 
rated at a certain level, they are often forced to sell their holdings for no other reason 
than merely a change in rating. 
Even though the paramount importance of emerging-market ratings is evident, 
the dearth of empirical studies on the topic was equally evident. The primary research 
objective of the current research was to establish the determinants of credit ratings in 
EMs, and this objective was largely achieved. 
Overall, there was strong suggestive evidence supporting the first two 
hypotheses. For hypothesis 1, it was proposed that there would be significant 
correlations amongst 18 independent variables and sovereign ratings. These 
correlations were in the proposed directions for all variables, except for GDP growth and 
primary balance, which did not reach statistical significance. 
 It was surprising that GDP growth did not significantly predict sovereign ratings, 
given that it is repeatedly mentioned in all of the rating agency methodology papers. 
One potential explanation is that larger, more established emerging-market countries 
such as Brazil and China have often “taken advantage of most of the easiest steps on 
the ladder to prosperity” (When giants… 2013). After some initial, early point of very 
strong growth, countries begin to experience diminishing marginal returns even with 
further investment. Moreover, as countries grow faster and reach a certain point of 
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development, they often begin to increase investment in an effort to build long-term 
future growth, perhaps at the expense of current growth. 
 Another surprise was that there was no significant relationship between primary 
balance as a percentage of GDP and sovereign ratings. To the extent that primary 
balances measure the degree of fiscal responsibility in a country, they should be 
correlated with measures of institutional governance. Indeed, there is a strong, positive 
correlation between primary balance and regulatory quality (r = 0.21, p < 0.05). As 
discussed previously, one potential possibility for the lack of relationship between this 
intuitively appealing factor and sovereign ratings is endogeneity. Countries with large 
primary balances are often those in IMF programmes and they are forced to run large 
primary deficits precisely because of the conditionality of those programmes. Some 
recent examples are Greece, Granada and Ghana. 
 Despite GDP growth and primary balance not having the predicted bivariate 
relationship to sovereign ratings, the majority of the proposed variables did. Based on 
both the strength of the linear relationships observed amongst the independent 
variables, as well as economic rationale and discretion, two primary models were 
specified to test for the joint impact of economic and governance variables on sovereign 
ratings. The resulting models had R2 values that were comparable to established 
literature (70–83%), but most importantly, used an extremely broad set of up to 84 
emerging-market countries. Even though the explanatory value was lower than some 
other researchers, this is understandable because this dataset includes more sovereign 
countries than any other in the existing literature. It is difficult to compare the predictive 
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power of these models against other researchers’ specifications because the datasets, 
time frames and statistical techniques differ. 
 Evidence strongly supported hypothesis 2 and every measure of governance 
positively and significantly correlated with all six individual specifications of sovereign 
ratings (S&P, Fitch and Moody’s local and foreign-currency ratings), as well as the 
aggregate measures of these individual ratings. Given the amount of attention the 
agencies place on understanding the institutional strengths of the country, it was not 
surprising that these measures accounted for much of the variation in sovereign ratings. 
Lastly, hypothesis 3 was not supported. It was anticipated that CRAs would rely on 
measures of governance even more heavily in countries with less economic 
development, but this did not seem to be supported by the interaction regression 
analysis.  
 Residual analysis was conducted to identify the instances in which the models 
performed well and poorly. Given the positive correlation between the regression 
models’ residuals and the actual sovereign ratings, it seemed that at the very least, the 
models operated best for countries that are mid-range in EMs (BB- to BBB). For 
countries that are rated in the top or bottom quartile, the accuracy of the models is 
challenged. 
 Upon closer inspection of the six countries with the largest misratings, some 
interesting patterns emerged. First, countries were often misrated as a result of political 
volatility around recent elections. India’s new government in 2014 was seen as much 
more market-friendly and constructive for economic growth than the previous 
administration, and the model failed to detect this optimism embedded in the sovereign 
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rating. Conversely, Greece’s new government in 2015 was seen as explicitly 
threatening to creditors, and the model failed to detect this pessimism. 
 Second, the models did not function well in idiosyncratic cases with risks that are 
neither easily anticipated nor quantifiable. For example, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
experienced a massive flood that devastated economic activity and production, 
depressed investment and caused unemployment to spike. Although some of these 
consequences would be symptomatically detected in the model variables (GDP per 
capita and perhaps regulatory quality), their true impact would be missed. As a final 
example, Mexico experienced credit upgrades as a result of passing monumental 
legislation to allow for private sector development of its oil and gas fields. Although 
Mexico did indeed experience an increase in its measure of regulatory quality, the 
measure (and by extension the models) probably underestimated the true extent of the 
potential impact of these energy reforms. Overall, the models provide a parsimonious 
method to analyse normative determinants of sovereign ratings across many countries, 
but fail to detect idiosyncratic developments that defy quantification. 
 
5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 The primary findings identified and quantified the impact of 18 potential variables 
that were chosen through an analysis of economic determinants, a study of rating 
agency methodologies and a review of empirical literature. The proposed models 
confirmed the joint impact of several variables that are associated with emerging-market 
ratings, as well as some that are not (GDP growth and primary balance). 
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 The current research made three methodological advances. First, the study used 
the largest known dataset of EM ratings. By focusing only on EMs, the current research 
did not confound its findings with developed countries. Unlike other research that mixes 
countries that are vastly economically different such as Ecuador and the USA (Mellios & 
Paget-Blanc 2006), the current research focused on only developing countries. Second, 
the research incorporated rating “outlooks” into the analyses, which allowed for more 
variability in the dependent variable and, in turn, raised the probability of detecting how 
subtle changes in the explanatory variables truly impact ratings. Also, research was 
conducted across both foreign and local-ratings, unlike previous studies. Finally, the 
research used forecasts of future economic activity across all countries, rather than past 
economic data, consistent with rating agency methodologies and economic intuition. No 
other known research has done the same. 
  
5.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Sovereign ratings are often a critical point of public debate and policymaking 
amongst countries and are discussed at length by presidents, finance ministers, 
economic ministers and legislators. Hence any improvement in the comprehension of 
how agencies construct ratings is important. A significant amount of policy attention is 
placed on how to maintain, if not improve, ratings. Table 5.1 shows a sample of 
germane comments from emerging-market policymakers.  
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 “Up to now, there is no indication that there will be a reduction of the [ratings] investment grade 
in the immediate future…" (Brandimarte 2014:para 1). [Brazil lost its investment-grade ratings 
status 11 months later.] 
Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, 
October 26, 2014  
 
Asked whether Moody's was poised to cut Brazil's sovereign rating, Levy said that “in the 
absence of an adjustment, that possibility increases”. Basically “it depends on how much 
adjustment we do,” he added. (Parra-Bernal 2015:para. 9). 
Joaquim Levy, Finance Minister of 
Brazil, July 20, 2015  
 
When S&P upgraded Colombia to investment-grade in March 2011, President Santos called the 
upgrade a “certificate of good behaviour.” (Colombia gains.. 2011:para. 1). 
Juan Manuel Santos, President of 
Colombia, March 16, 2011  
 
“We have a goal that is not easy, but that will guide us. To improve our credit rating from BBB to 
BBB+...that means adopting best practices in every area of public policy” (Moss 2015:para. 4).  
Mauricio Cardenas, Finance Minister of 
Colombia, July 31, 2015 
 
"I consider the evaluation of Moody's not simply extremely negative, but based on extremely 
pessimistic forecasts that have no analogies to today...I suppose that in taking the decision 
about lowering the rating, the agency was led first of all by factors of a political character" 
(Korsunskaya 2015:para. 3). 
Anton Siluanov, Finance Minister of 
Russia, January 15, 2015  
 
Table 5.1: Sample comments from policymakers about sovereign ratings 
 
Sovereign downgrades are often used by political opponents as ammunition against 
incumbent administrations. 
Given the amount of attention on sovereign ratings by politicians, it makes sense 
for policymakers to best understand the causes of these ratings──the current research 
should contribute to this understanding. The current study identified the most likely 
combination of parsimonious variables that explain local and foreign-currency ratings. 
These variables tend to operate consistently across all major agencies, which removes 
the uncertainty that policymakers may have about factors each specific agency is using 
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in its assessments. Policymakers should find some comfort in knowing that agencies 
look at similar factors. 
Although considerations for ratings will never be a primary focus for any 
policymaker, nor should they be, there are certain pragmatic steps that can be taken to 
increase the probability of a more accurate rating. Since each of the agencies places a 
premium on reliable, transparent and timely economic data, it would behove sovereign 
statistical agencies to meet these criteria. This is relatively low-hanging fruit for most 
countries and could immediately influence the perception that agencies have of a 
country. There are wide variations in statistical and economic reporting, Brazil, for 
instance reports some of its inflation estimates weekly, while Venezuela as of 2014 had 
not published its inflation estimates for a full year. 
 Transparency in the ratings process works both ways, and countries wishing to 
be fairly assessed should provide timely data. However, CRAs also have an opportunity 
to provide more guidance. The current research identified and quantified the factors 
agencies use to rate emerging countries, but the agencies themselves could 
communicate their own assessment models to policymakers. One immediate 
improvement that the CRAs could make is related to their measures of governance. 
Most agencies use World Bank governance indicators, which were used in the current 
study, but these are only annual indicators. Agency analysts might be encouraged to 
use more timely metrics themselves that could more accurately reflect the current and 
near-term political and institutional trajectories. 
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The current study not only hopes to fill some of the gap in emerging-market 
sovereign ratings research, but also to contribute to future lines of research. First, the 
current research presented a static model of a single cross-section of data, future 
research could expand on this by creating a panel of cross-sectional longitudinal data. 
There would be a trade-off between the breadth and depth of economic and ratings data 
because some countries have only recently been assigned ratings (Cuba, Lesotho and 
Nicaragua). However, there would be clear statistical advantages to panel analyses. 
Second, although the present research attempted to identify the broad 
determinants of all countries’ ratings, future research could identify parameters for 
country and agency-specific models. Owing to the fact that some EM countries such as 
Greece and Mexico have a significant history of sovereign ratings and economic data, it 
would be compelling to analyse the determinants over time for individual countries. 
Moreover, even though there is a high correlation amongst agencies’ ratings, there is 
still disagreement about the precise level of sovereign creditworthiness. The majority of 
the countries in the current dataset have ratings that are not perfectly in line with other 
agencies – so-called “split ratings” – and it would be informative to examine the 
determinants of each agency’s ratings. Explanatory power might be increased by 
identifying the idiosyncratic determinants for each rating agency’s assessments.  Lastly, 
future research might move up a level of analysis and examine not only the 
determinants of ratings, but also why certain countries choose to be unrated at all, even 
when they have ample resources to fund the service. At least 58 countries remain 
unrated, and despite misconceptions, many of them have relatively strong credit 
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metrics. Patient, but compelling, “out of sample” research could produce potential credit 
ratings for these countries and then wait until a sufficient number of these ratings are 
eventually published. 
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APPENDIX 
  
 
Table A.1: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings 
 
  
 
Table A.2: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings 
  
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 41.833*** 6.712 41.700*** 6.996
Voice -0.057 0.140 -0.080 -0.053 0.146 -0.071
GDP Capita 0.001** 0.001 0.460 0.002** 0.001 0.482
GDP Capita * Voice 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.124
Countries 79 79
R
2
0.313 0.315
Adj-R
2
0.286 0.287
SE 12.755 13.293
Durbin-Watson 1.567 1.539
F-statistic 11.39*** 11.49***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 6a: Average FC rating Model 6b: Average LC rating
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 43.823*** 5.574 44.396*** 5.793
Political Stability -0.133 0.134 -0.193 -0.154 0.140 -0.214
GDP Capita 0.001** 0.001 0.461 0.002*** 0.001 0.492
GDP Capita * Political Stability 0.000 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.216
Countries 79 79
R
2
0.321 0.326
Adj-R
2
0.293 0.299
SE 12.684 13.182
Durbin-Watson 1.621 1.601
F-statistic 11.799*** 12.108***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 7a: Average FC rating Model 7b: Average LC rating
 109 
 
 
Table A.3: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings  
  
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 34.242*** 6.246 33.926*** 6.527
Gov 0.230** 0.134 0.294 0.242** 0.140 0.297
GDP Capita 0.000 0.001 -0.087 0.000 0.001 -0.063
GDP Capita * Gov 0.000 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.456
Countries 79 79
R
2
0.440 0.438
Adj-R
2
0.417 0.416
SE 11.520 12.040
Durbin-Watson 1.652 1.633
F-statistic 19.608*** 19.483***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 8a: Average FC rating Model 8b: Average LC rating
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 36.987*** 6.303 36.639*** 6.591
Reg Qual 0.148 0.129 0.194 0.161 0.135 0.202
GDP Capita -0.001 0.001 -0.222 -0.001 0.001 -0.200
GDP Capita * Reg Qual 0.001*** 0.000 0.746 0.001*** 0.000 0.719
Countries 79 79
R
2
0.520 0.518
Adj-R
2
0.500 0.499
SE 10.665 11.151
Durbin-Watson 1.829 1.801
F-statistic 27.048*** 26.853***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 9a: Average FC rating Model 9b: Average LC rating
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Table A.5: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings  
 
  
 
Table A.6: Results of regression and interaction analyses predicting average foreign 
and local-currency ratings 
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 37.621*** 5.922 37.589*** 6.195
Law 0.116 0.127 0.161 0.120 0.133 0.160
GDP Capita 0.000 0.001 0.114 0.000 0.001 0.133
GDP Capita * Law 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.382
Countries 79 79
R
2
0.399 0.396
Adj-R
2
0.375 0.372
SE 11.934 12.483
Durbin-Watson 1.637 1.616
F-statistic 16.567*** 16.378***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 10a: Average FC rating Model 10b: Average LC rating
B SE of B β B SE of B β
C 38.430*** 5.277 38.550*** 5.510
Corruption 0.062 0.118 0.089 0.061 0.124 0.084
GDP Capita 0.001 0.001 0.319 0.001 0.001 0.332
GDP Capita * Corruption 0.000 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.216
Countries 79 79
R
2 0.343 0.342
Adj-R
2 0.316 0.316
SE 12.477 13.027
Durbin-Watson 1.542 1.516
F-statistic 13.030*** 12.995***
Note.*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 11a: Average FC rating Model 11b: Average LC rating
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